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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Requirements for a Well-Balanced Sales Law Regime 
In a well-balanced sales law regime such as the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) and 
every modern national sales law, a contracting party’s knowledge has 
decisive importance as it shapes the rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties. A contracting party will in some situations only gain 
rights if there is certain knowledge and can likewise lose rights by 
awareness of certain facts. In cases where a right is acquired or lost, the 
counter party will be imposed or released of the obligation corresponding to 
the right in question. A sales law can consequently only achieve a 
reasonable balance of the rights and obligation of the parties to a sales 
contract if the parties’ actual (de facto) knowledge and the knowledge that a 
prudent or reasonable seller or buyer “should have had” or “could not have 
been unaware of” (constructive knowledge) are taken into account. These 
two emphasized examples of terms and formulations are indicators of a 
certain degree of diligence (negligence) and reasonable expected conduct of 
care by the contracting parties. The reason for this diligence requirement 
seems evident. De facto or constructive knowledge attributable to one or 
both of the contracting parties will influence and often determine various 
rights and obligations under the sales contract, inter alia, whether a right 
under the contract is acquired, whether a breach, including a fundamental 
breach, exists, whether one of the parties has reasonable expectations 
regarding the contract formation and performance, and whether the strict 
notice requirements apply and ultimately whether a remedy is available. In 
one important respect the CISG avoids relying on the concept of intent or 
negligence (culpa) as the no-fault principle rules under the Convention for 
the liability to pay damage for breach of contract. If you are in breach of 
contract you are liable under the CISG according to the causation based 
expectation principle.1 Nevertheless, whereas the CISG evades the fault-
                                                                                                                           
 
1 The no-fault principle is not expressly stated in the CISG, but can be derived from CISG Article 
45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) according to which if a party “fails to perform any of his obligations under the 
contract or this Convention” the other contracting party may “claim damages as provided in Articles 74–
77.” United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. 
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principle as a requirement for a claim of damage, it does not in toto avert 
the concept of negligence as part of its no-fault expectation principle. The 
CISG foreseeability limitation of damages provides that “damages may not 
exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract. . . .”2 This is but yet another 
CISG expression which indicates a certain degree of diligence (negligence). 
B. The Inquiry into the “Knowledge Test” 
The core two questions are, on the one hand, how de facto knowledge 
is established and, on the other hand, how constructive knowledge of a 
party is determined. The first issue is predominantly a quest for the national 
applicable law of evidence of the lex fori having in mind that the allocation 
of the burden of proof can be settled by the substantive applicable law—the 
lex contractus.3 The second issue concerns the constructive knowledge and 
focuses on what kind of care (diligence) a party in the circumstances must 
exercise in order to become aware of relevant facts. This is a quest of the 
substantive law exclusively and, thus, for the CISG to answer. If the 
question is phrased in the negative it concerns which test is applied to put a 
contracting party on a constructive (fictive) knowledge in the sense that the 
party is intentionally or negligently unware of certain facts. The knowledge 
test will therefore make use of one or more degrees of intent and 
negligence, which decides whether such unacceptable ignorance is present. 
                                                                                                                           
 
Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG or 
Convention]. 
2 CISG, supra note 1, at art. 74 (emphasis added). Article 74 expresses a principle familiar to 
most legal systems including the English common law. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 
145 (Exch.) 151 (“Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: Where two parties 
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive 
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either 
arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such 
as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made 
the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”) (emphasis added). 
3 See the decision kantonsgericht Nidwalden May 28, 2005, No. ZK 04 26 (Switz.), available at 
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/display.cfm?test=1086, where the court found that 
questions about the measurement of proof and the necessary degree of judicial conviction are governed 
by the law of the forum; see id. at 12, para. 3.1: Fragen des Beweismasses, der notwendige Grad der 
richterlichen Überzeugung, sind dagegen der lex fori, in casu dem Schweizerischen Privatrecht, zu 
entnehmen. 
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The content of many sales law provisions such as, inter alia, the caveat 
emptor rule and other CISG provisions depends on the de facto (actual) 
knowledge or presumed (constructive) knowledge of one of the parties and, 
thus, boils down to one inquiry: the content of the mental element or 
“subjective test” or, as it is better termed, the “knowledge test.” To which 
degree must a CISG-contracting party be aware in order to have sufficient 
“knowledge” of relevant facts, and do different degrees of negligence 
legally exist for the determination of a constructive knowledge under the 
CISG so that a party cannot just be negligent but more or less negligent? 
The CISG provides no definition or specific guidance in this regard, and the 
convention employs varying nomenclature to express the content of the 
applicable “knowledge test” and the notion of negligence. 
C. Degrees of Negligence 
The question of whether one or more degrees of negligence exist and 
of its borderline to intent on the one hand and mere accident on the other 
hand has been the subject of intense scholarly debate and dispute since 
Roman times. It has occupied doctrine and frequently surfaced in case law 
both in criminal law and civil law but is comparatively still controversial.4 
In civil law, some national legislators use various expressions in statutory 
provisions to indicate a degree of negligence and/or a lower degree of 
intent.5 Other national lawmakers are more cautious and, thus, disciplined 
and refer to a limited category of terms and concepts in the sense of a 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 See Shelden D. Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 91, 91–98 (1933) (discussing 
an account of the development of the concept of negligence from Roman law in a common law 
perspective); for the continental European viewpoint see Theo Mayer-Maly, Die Wiederkehr der culpa 
levissima: Diagnosen und Reflexionen zur Lehre von den Fahrlässigkeitsstufen, 163 ARCHIV FÜR DIE 
CIVILLISTISCHE PRAXIS 114 (1964) (discussing the continental European viewpoint of negligence and 
arguing for a return to the threefold distinction of the degrees of negligence originating from Roman law 
and the usus modernus). See Dan W. Morkel, On the Distinction Between Recklessness and Conscious 
Negligence, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 325 (1982), for a comparative criminal law overview of the different 
concepts used to indicate intent and negligence and where these two forms meet. 
5 A striking example are the statutes on tort immunity, solidary liability and exemplary damage 
enacted by the Louisiana Legislature that use different terms and combinations thereof to indicate a 
degree of intention and gross negligence. Edwin D. Byrd, Reflections on Willful, Wanton, Reckless, and 
Gross Negligence, 48 LA. L. REV. 1383, 1386–87 (1988). See Justin Ward, Filling the Gaps: The Value 
of the Common Law Approach to Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 215 
(2013), for the subsequent development of gross negligence under Louisiana law. 
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twofold distinction of negligence, which has a general uniform concept of 
ordinary (simple) negligence and only by exception employs a concept of a 
higher degree of negligence in the sense of gross negligence.6 In the 
development of Roman law, the origin of the threefold distinction of 
degrees negligence is found: culpa lata (gross negligence), culpa levis 
(ordinary or simple negligence) and culpa levissima (slight negligence).7 
The usus modernus in Germany (das gemeine Recht) followed this tripartite 
distinction.8 In English common law the Roman threefold distinction of 
negligence was introduced by Chief Justice Holt in Coggs v. Bernard, 
where Holt referred to “some gross neglect,” “any ordinary neglect” and 
“the least neglect.”9 With this decision the concept of “gross negligence” 
entered into the English common law, and subsequently, the threefold 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 See Mayer-Maley, supra note 4, at 124 (discussing the historical development in continental 
European law-German, Austrian, French, Italian and Spanish law). A similar development has taken 
place in Nordic law, where in general the ordinary negligence standard (simple culpa) applies based on 
the pater familias notion, but the gross negligence standard is foreseen for various specific issues. See 
købelov [Kbl] [Sale of Goods Act], nr. 140 (2014) (Den.) § 53 (stating the seller’s knowledge required 
in order to make the strict notice requirements inoperative); Patienterstatningen [Liability for Damages 
Act], nr. 266 (2014) (Den.) § 19 (regarding an exception from immunity for liability for damages 
covered by an insurance); Tinglysning vedrørende fast ejendom [Registration of Property], nr. 1075 
(2014) (Den.) § 5 (regarding the requirement for acquisition in good faith); Bekendtgørelse af lov om 
fragtaftaler ved international vejtransport [CMR] [Act on Contract for international road transport], nr. 
602 (1986) (Den.) § 37 (implementing the concept of “willful misconduct” from Article 29 of the 
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road by using “intentionally” 
and “gross negligence”). 
7 Elliott, supra note 4, at 95. It is debated whether in the text of Justinian a three- or twofold 
distinction is reflected. Id. 
8 Mayer-Maly, supra note 4, at 124. 
9 Coggs v. Bernard, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B.) 110-11 (Lord Holt, C.J.). Lord Holt states the 
following regarding keeping goods in the custody of another: “As to the . . . first sort, where a man takes 
goods in his custody to keep for the use of the bailor, I shall consider, for what things such a bailee is 
answerable. He is not answerable, if they are stole without any fault in him, neither will a common 
neglect make him chargeable, but he must be guilty of some gross neglect. There is I confess a great 
authority against me . . . .” Id. at 110 (emphasis added). “This Bracton I have cited is, I confess, an old 
author, but in this his doctrine is agreeable to reason, and to what the law is in other countries. The civil 
law is so, as you have it in Justinian’s Inst. lib. 3, tit. 15. There the law goes farther . . . . So that a bailee 
is not chargeable without an apparent gross neglect.” Id. at 111. “[I]f the bailee be guilty of gross 
negligence, he will be chargeable, but not for any ordinary neglect.” Id. (emphasis added). Chief Justice 
Holt further explains lending of goods for use where slight negligence applies: “As to the second sort of 
bailment, viz. commodatum or lending gratis, the borrower is bound to the strictest care and diligence, 
to keep the goods, so as to restore them back again to the lender, because the bailee has a benefit by the 
use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least neglect, he will be answerable . . . .” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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degrees of negligence and the term “gross negligence” was adopted in U.S. 
American jurisprudence by Circuit Justice Joseph Story in Tracy v. Wood.10 
Whereas Chief Justice Holt in Coggs v. Bernard left the definition of the 
three degrees of negligence open for the future development, Story 
elaborated in detail on the definition of gross negligence compared with 
ordinary and slight negligence.11 The tripartite distinction of the degrees of 
negligence has been challenged and criticized and the concept of gross 
negligence has been under attack as well.12 Today, often a twofold 
distinction is used with a uniform concept of ordinary negligence (culpa) 
and the possibility to set a higher gross negligence standard if deemed 
appropriate for certain specific questions in either tort law, property law or 
contract (sales) law. This short sketch shows that the national legal systems 
partly founded on the Roman law heritage are not alien to a distinction 
between different degrees of negligence but illuminates at the same time the 
inevitable challenges of adopting ill- or undefined legal terms. This will 
need consideration when the eyes are turned from national law to the global 
sales law regime of the CISG. 
D. The Practical Importance 
The practical importance of the different content of the knowledge test 
for a sales law regime is immense. When first the level for the relevant 
knowledge is set this will make a provision beneficial and advantageous to 
one of the contracting parties and disadvantageous to the other contracting 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117 (C.C.D. R.I. 1822) (No. 14,130) (Story, Cir. J.). 
11 Id. “After summing up the facts, said, I agree to the law as laid down at the bar, that in cases of 
bailees without reward, they are liable only for gross negligence. Id. at 118. Story continues his 
statement with the following definition of the three degrees of negligence: “The question is not whether 
he has omitted that care, which very prudent persons usually take of their own property, for the omission 
of that would be but slight negligence: nor whether he has omitted that care which prudent persons 
ordinarily take of their own property, for that would be but ordinary negligence. But whether there be a 
want of that care, which men of common sense, however inattentive, usually take, or ought to be 
presumed to take of their property, for that is gross negligence.” Id. (emphasis added). 
12 See Grant H. Morris, Gross Negligence in Michigan—How Gross Is It?, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 
457, 468 (1969) (arguing that the term “gross negligence” should be eliminated from the legal lexicon as 
courts are unable to properly define and apply the term); see also Jacqueline Monte, “Gross 
Negligence” and “Wilful and Wanton Conduct”—Thanks to Jennings v. Southwood, Michigan Now 
Knows What They Mean, U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1379 (1995) (discussing the development of the 
concept of “gross negligence”). 
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party. A clear illustration is de facto knowledge or presumed (constructive) 
knowledge required to make the caveat venditor principle and the caveat 
emptor rule operate.13 Based on this knowledge both the seller and the 
buyer will need to make caveats and to take precautions regarding known 
facts about the goods being traded, their intended use and the expected 
market. The content of the knowledge test tells what kind of care the seller 
and the buyer must take and what kind of inspection they must make in 
order for a seller not to be held liable for an alleged lack for conformity 
under the caveat venditor principle and in order for a buyer to retain the 
remedies available in case of an alleged non-conformity under the caveat 
emptor rule. Furthermore, the knowledge test indicates which exchange of 
information between the parties can be expected in good faith regarding the 
quality and expected use of the goods and is, therefore, the basis for a 
reasonable good faith requirement on both parties not to withhold important 
information from the other. A convincing and functional sales law regime 
must provide for a clear concept of the knowledge test and entail an 
operational design that, in a balanced way, decides when the different levels 
of a party’s actual or constructive knowledge apply. Such a balanced design 
ensures, in particular, that equilibrium between the caveat venditor 
principle and the caveat emptor rule is created. 
The text of the CISG consists of such a functional and balanced 
contract and sales law system apt for uniform interpretation, however, this 
is not reflected in the divergent views expressed in doctrine or by the non-
uniform interpretation of the knowledge test in practice under the current 
CISG case law. The result is that those courts which rightly do not shy 
away from the demand of a uniform interpretation and do reject a lex fori 
construction have difficulties and do not feel comfortable when interpreting 
the knowledge test under the CISG. As the Israeli Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 A CISG seller must according to the caveat venditor principle deliver goods fit for ordinary use 
or any particular purpose made known to him (CISG, supra note 1, at art. 35(2)) but can rely on the 
strict notice requirements in case of an alleged lack of conformity by the buyer (CISG, supra note 1, at 
arts. 38–39). However, the seller’s reliance on the notice requirement comes with an important 
exception in case the seller already knows or has constructive knowledge about the lack of conformity, 
then it would be unreasonable and pure formalism to demand the buyer to notify. See Bundesgericht 
[BGer] Apr. 2, 2015, No. 4A 614/2014 (Switz.), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/ 
api/cisg/display.cfm?test=2592 [hereinafter Wire Rod case], para. 7.2.2.3: “Es wäre unbillig und 
überflüssiger Formalismus, vom Käufer zu verlangen, den verkäufer über Solche Mängel zu 
unterrichten, die diesem schon bekannt sind oder seinmüssen.” 
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emphasized in its decision in 2009 in Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael 
Mendelson Ltd. on the interpretation of ULIS Article 40 (identical to that in 
CISG Article 40), a review of the ULIS and CISG literature does not leave 
the courts with a clear picture: 
It would appear that the main question is whether the expression “of which he 
could not have been unaware” should be interpreted as a requirement of de facto 
awareness (or the equivalent), or whether it should be interpreted as a normative 
requirement, which includes awareness of the facts of which a reasonable seller 
should have been aware. Prima facie, the wording of the article does not support 
“normative” awareness (negligence) but requires de facto awareness . . . . 
. . . . 
Despite the textual restrictions, scholars and various courts have adopted an 
interpretation that art. 40 also applies in cases where the seller is not de facto 
aware of the non-conformity in the goods . . . . In other words, the spectrum of 
views ranges from “almost fraud” to negligence that constitutes a violation of 
“customary care in trade.”14 
E. Aim and Structure of the Analysis 
There is as far as known to the author no in-depth analysis of the 
content and effect of the knowledge test under the global CISG regime nor 
is there a profound investigation of the knowledge test together with the 
connected issues of a possible duty to make a pre-contractual inspection 
and the placement of the burden of proof. This is the aim of this article. It 
will be based on the assumption that the CISG knowledge test und its 
underlying standards are issues governed and settled by the CISG and, thus, 
to be developed inside the CISG in a uniform manner. Following this view, 
the CISG knowledge test has neither external gaps outside the CISG nor 
internal gaps in accordance with Article 7(2) within the CISG for which a 
recourse to private international law and the applicable domestic law is 
necessary or permitted.15 Emphasis in the analysis will be put on the CISG 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Eng’g Technical Supply Ltd., IsrLR 27, 
¶ 38 [2009] (Isr.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html (emphasis added). 
15 See Morten M. Fogt, Private International Law in the Process of Harmonization of 
International Commercial Law: The ‘Ugly Duckling’?, in UNIFICATION AND HARMONIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW INTERACTION OR DEHARMONIZATION? 57, 91–98 (Morten M. Fogt 
ed., 2012) for a discussion of the possible choice of State law within and outside an instrument of 
harmonization, in particular for the so called internal and external gaps regarding the CISG. Different 
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case law, which on several occasions has inconsistently dealt with the 
question of the knowledge test under the CISG. In 2012 the English High 
Court did express doubts about the interpretation of the CISG knowledge 
test and in 2014–15 European Supreme Courts have interpreted the 
knowledge test in Article 40 CISG differently using a variety of terms.16 
The divergent views in doctrine which will also be included in this survey 
are to a large extent based on this non-uniform body of CISG court 
decisions and arbitral awards, which is often not considered 
comprehensively. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the general CISG-
setting and the demand for uniform interpretation and development and, 
moreover, identifies the relevant textual basis for the knowledge test and its 
                                                                                                                           
 
from the CISG, the CMR-Convention in Article 29 determines carrier liability by determining whether 
damage was caused by “willful misconduct” or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the 
law of the court or tribunal seized of the case, is considered as equivalent to “wilful misconduct.” 
Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), May 19, 1956, 399 
U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter CMR Convention]. The Danish legislature, in instituting the CMR 
Convention has defined “willful misconduct” as intent (“forsæt”) or a “default . . . equivalent to wilful 
misconduct” as gross negligence (“grov uagtsomhed”). Bekendtgørelse af lov om fragtaftaler ved 
international vejtransport [CMR] [Act on Contract for international road transport], nr. 602 (1986) 
(Den.) § 37. See Morten M. Fogt, Transportret, in FORMUERETLIGE EMNER 129, 183–86 (6th ed. 2013) 
for reference to the latest rulings of the Danish Supreme Court: Højesteret [Danish Supreme Court] 
UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN [UfR] 2004.366 (Den.) (denying gross negligence); Højesteret [Danish 
Supreme Court] UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN [UfR] 2012.115 (Den.) (denying gross negligence); 
Højesteret [Danish Supreme Court] UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN [UfR] 2014.1183 (Den.) (holding that 
there was gross negligence due to “such a serious breach of the standards which must be applied to a 
carrier”—“en så graverende tilsidesættelse af de normer, som må gælde for en fragtfører”). 
16 See Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S [2012] EWHC (Comm) 1147 [1022] (Eng.), available 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/120501uk.html (favouring a de facto knowledge test expressed as 
“willful blindness to the obvious”); S.T.S., July 9, 2014 (R.J. No. 4523) (Spain), available at http:// 
www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2578.pdf (applying a standard of (ordinary) negligence 
conduct and behaviour indicated as “un comportamiento negligente”) [hereinafter Red pepper powder 
case]; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 24, 2014, 202 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 258 (Ger.), available at http://www 
.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2545.pdf (using a gross negligence standard expressed as 
“ins Auge springen müssen” (must jump into the eyes)); Cour de cassation (Cass.) (supreme court for 
judicial matters), com, Nov. 4, 2014, Bull. Civ. IV, No. 947 (Fr.), available at http://www 
.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2563.pdf [hereinafter Christmas tree case] (demanding bad 
faith “mauvaise foi” in terms that a party “connaissait les défauts de conformité et qu’il s’est abstenu de 
les lui révéler”); Wire Rod case, supra note 13 (requiring only superficial (less) diligence: “Die 
Formulierung ‘nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte’ meint Fälle, in denen der Verkäufer erhebliche und 
offensichtliche Mängel nicht entdeckt hat, die auch bei oberflächlicher Sorgfalt auffallen mussten”); see 
infra Parts V.C and V.E. for comments on the foregoing cases. 
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disputed interpretation. It is argued that the CISG consists of an integrated 
and coherent sales law regime, which as a strong presumption builds on 
underlying principles and standards. In the first stage of the analysis, Part 
III deduces from the legislative history a seemingly clear interpretation. For 
the purpose of comparison, the article focuses in Parts IV–V on the 
provisions about the buyer’s knowledge (making the caveat emptor rule 
operative) and seller’s knowledge (making the notice requirements 
inoperative) and analyzes the content of the knowledge test in doctrine and 
case law. Part VI presents the overall conclusion for the knowledge test 
according to which the CISG embodies a threefold knowledge test with a 
culpa levis, culpa lata and de facto knowledge standard. Hereafter, Part VI 
continues with an analysis of the apparently difficult gross negligence 
standard and guidance on a definition of gross negligence is presented. In 
Parts VII–VIII the interconnected issues of a pre-contractual examination 
and the burden of proof question are addressed before Part IX discusses the 
relationship between the knowledge test and a de minimis bona fide 
requirement. A conclusion and an outlook for the knowledge test under the 
CISG in Part X finalizes the analysis. 
II. THE KNOWLEDGE TEST UNDER THE CISG IN GENERAL—GENERAL 
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS 
The content of the knowledge test is not defined under the uniform 
CISG regime.17 Thus the content of the test must be established taking into 
account the demand for a uniform interpretation of the Convention text 
under CISG Article 7(1) and established principles of treaty interpretation. 
The starting point is (and must be) the CISG text itself and the literal 
understanding of the wording and textual context of the provision in 
question with regard to the object and purpose and possible recourse to 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 On the contrary, such a definition of the term “know or ought to have known” is provided for 
by Article 13 of the 1964 Hague Convention on the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods. 
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 
107 art. 13 [hereinafter ULIS]. See also 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 170 (1965) [hereinafter 29 RABELSZ] (containing the French and 
English text of the ULIS). However, there is no definition in ULIS of the later adopted term 
“connaissait ou ne pouvait ignorer” or “could not have been unaware of” in the caveat emptor rule in 
ULIS Article 36. ULIS, supra note 17. 
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supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work (the 
travaux préparatoires) in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“VCLT”).18 
When estimating the “knowledge” of one of the contracting parties, it 
is crucial to distinguish, on the one hand, a party and a third party engaged 
by that party for the purpose of negotiating, concluding, and performing the 
sales contract from, on the other hand, an independent third party whose 
knowledge is without significance and cannot to attributed to one of the 
parties to the contract. It is clear, and has been confirmed in case law, that a 
contracting party answers for the de facto knowledge or presumed 
knowledge (constructive knowledge) of any third party it has engaged,19 or 
of a person who is just de facto acting on behalf of one of the parties in the 
negotiations.20 It may be assumed that this is a common situation in 
international sales transactions, which typically involve multiple parties 
acting on behalf of one or both of the contracting parties. In case a third 
party is engaged by the contracting parties jointly or by one of them acting 
on behalf of both parties, the knowledge or constructive knowledge of that 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 arts. 31–32 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. It should be emphasized that both the VCLT and 
general principles of treaty interpretation are open for use of travaux préparatoire in the process of 
treaty interpretation in confirming and determining the meaning of a text. The travaux préparatoires are 
not a priori excluded or a priori reduced to a secondary (often insignificant) means of interpretation. Jan 
Klabbers, International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty 
Interpretation?, 50 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 267, 288 (2003); see also Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux 
of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 820–22 
(2013). 
19 See, e.g., Case No. 9187 of 1999 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) [hereinafter Coke case], available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=466&step=FullText (“If the seller uses auxiliary 
people for the performance of its contractual obligations, the consequences of their knowledge or 
grossly negligent lack of knowledge of the non-conformity have to be borne by the seller as if it had 
acted itself. . . .”). 
20 See Oberlandesgericht Dresden [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] May 27, 2010, Case No. 
10 U 450/09, 10 (Ger.), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2182.pdf 
[hereinafter Used Chevrolet Corvette case] (“Hinsichtlich der als Mangel gerügten “fehlerhaft verlegten 
Bremsleistung” sind Sachmängelrechte der Klägerin [the buyer] jedenfalls nach Art. 35 Abs. 3 CISG 
ausgeschlossen . . . des die Verkaufsverhandlungen führenden Ehemannes der Klägerin bereits 
vorgetragen gehabt, dass der “Beklagte [the seller] bei der Besichtigung des Fahrzeugs durch die 
Klägerin erklärt habe, die Bremsleitung müsse nur etwas zur Seite geborgen werden, damit sie nicht 
mehr an Karosserieteilen scheuere.” Damit räumt sie aber ein, dass sie bzw. Ihr Ehemann—dessen 
Wissen als Verhandlungsvertreter sie sich zurechnen lassen muss—Kenntnis von der nicht 
vorschriftsmässigen Verlegung der Bremsleitung im Motorraum hatte bzw. nicht im Unklaren darüber 
sein konnte”) (emphasis added). 
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third party in principle is attributed to both contracting parties, whether or 
not they actually share it with the third party or each other. Consequently, 
the knowledge of that third party builds a common understanding of the 
parties to the sales contract.21 Even when the parties henceforth in principle 
share the knowledge of a third party, the consequences may differ 
depending on the applicable knowledge test for the seller and the buyer and, 
thus, the context of the legal question being considered. The third-party 
knowledge thus attributed to a buyer will preclude a determination that a 
seller acted fraudulently or in bad faith by not personally disclosing this 
knowledge to the buyer. This third-party knowledge is also relevant in 
determining the conformity of the goods under the caveat emptor rule. 
There should be a strong presumption that the CISG reflects an 
integrated and coherent regime employing legal terms and formulations on 
important issues, for example, regarding the required test of a contracting 
party’s actual or constructive knowledge. The same or similar terms and 
formulations in the CISG should not be interpreted differently for each and 
every provision or parts of the convention, unless this is supported by the 
intention of the drafters and/or by convincing reasons. The terms and 
formulations should therefore, as a clear starting point for the interpretation, 
be seen as amounting to underlying principles on which the convention is 
based according to CISG Article 7(2). 
Similarly, there should be a strong presumption that when the text of 
the Convention employs decisively different wording on a particular issue, 
it is intended to have a legislative purpose. In particular, where the wording 
of a CISG provision is ambiguous or unclear, the legislative history (the 
travaux préparatoires of the Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of 
Law Governing the International Sale of Goods and the United Nations 
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods) may provide 
support for the proper interpretation of the provision and guidance on the 
ratio legis. 
VLCT Articles 31–32 allow reference to the travaux préparatoires 
without setting a clear, rigid hierarchy of the means of treaty interpretation 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 See Coke case, supra note 19 (holding that where both parties had engaged an agent to analyze 
weight and quality of the cokes at the loading port and the agent should have discovered the non-
conformity, CISG Article 40 was inapplicable because the agent was not an ancillary third party used by 
the seller alone). 
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privileging the textual approach.22 When the wording of a text is clear and 
virtually undisputed, the travaux préparatoires are less important in 
confirming the interpretation.23 However, in the many contestable situations 
where the meaning of the text of a treaty, such as the CISG, is unclear and 
disputed, the travaux préparatoires can play an important role in 
confirming, supporting, or disapproving an interpretation, and should be 
consulted to shed light on the meaning, context, and ratio legis of the text.24 
As some authors stress, the drafting history is important in any case of 
interpretation though the wording in VCLT Article 32 partly suggests 
otherwise, and though the travaux may not always give clear answers.25 
A. The Threefold Distinction of the Legal Terms 
The CISG employs a general threefold distinction of the legal terms 
which describe the knowledge or constructive knowledge of the contracting 
parties used throughout the Convention.26 In the official English version of 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 VCLT arts. 31–32, supra note 18. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. See Case No. 2319 of 2002, para. 110-11 (Neth. Arb. Inst.) (Condensate crude oil mix 
case), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/021015n1.html#cx (“In solving 
this interpretation issue, attention is also to be paid to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties dated May 23, 1969. Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Treaty permits to resort to the 
travaux préparatoires of treaties to explain ambiguous or unclear treaty provisions. Article 35(2)(a) 
CISG may thus be interpreted on the basis of the preparatory work during the negotiations leading to 
CISG . . . .”). 
25 See Mortenson, supra note 18, at 821 (“Far from being disfavoured, travaux were expected to 
be an integral component of interpretation.”). 
26 Perhaps differently (and if differently, then incorrectly) the French Cour de Cassation stated: 
“Alors, d’autre part, qu’en tout état de cause en vertu de l’article 40 de la Convention de Vienne le 
vendeur ne peut pas se prévaloir de l’article 39 lorsque le défaut de conformité porte sur des faits qu’il 
connaissait ou ne pouvait ignorer et qu’il n’a pas révélé à l’acheteur; que la [French buyer] avait fait 
valoir que la [Dutch seller] ne pouvait ignorer que les capuchons qu’elle avait livrés ne correspondaient 
pas aux obligations qu’elle avait contractées envers la [French buyer] et qu’elle ne pouvait dès lors en 
vertu de l’article 40 de la Convention de Vienne se prévaloir de son article 39; qu’en l’état de ces 
conclusions d’appel, la Cour d’appel qui n’a pas recherché si [Dutch seller] connaissait ou aurait dû 
connaître le défaut de conformité litigieux, a privé sa décision de base légale au regard des articles 39 et 
40 de la Convention de Vienne.” Cour de cassation (Cass.) (supreme court for judicial matters), com, 
Feb. 3, 2009, Case No. 07-21827 (Fr.), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/ 
urteile/1843.pdf. The French expression “connaissait ou aurait dû connaître” (knew or ought to have 
known) is not found in CISG Article 40 and does, according to the clearly prevailing view, indicate a 
different standard in the sense of simple negligence. 
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the Convention,27 they are the following: 
1) “knew”28 or “made known”29 or “become aware”30 or “to make 
known”31 or “is aware”32 
2) “could not have been unaware”33 
3) “ought to have known,”34 “ought to have discovered”35 or “would 
have had”36 or “would not have,”37 “ought to have become aware 
of”38 or “ought to have foreseen.”39 
Whereas there is agreement that the terms in the first group concern 
the actual knowledge or awareness of a person (a contracting party or a 
third party acting on behalf of one or both parties), and that those in the 
third group reflect the constructive knowledge a reasonable business person 
in the same circumstances (bonus pater familias) would have had or ought 
to have known (ordinary or simple negligence),40 the meaning of the second 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Note that of the six official versions of the CISG in Article 101, in fine (Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian, and Spanish), courts and scholars are often only fully acquainted with some of 
the language versions. For the present author, these are English, French, and Spanish. 
28 CISG, supra note 1, at arts. 2(a), 8(1), 9(2), 31(b), 35(3), 38(3), 40, 42(1), 42(2)(a), 43(2), 
49(2)(b)(i), 64(2)(b)(i), 68. 
29 Id. at art. 35(2)(b). 
30 Id. at arts. 43(1), 49(2)(a), 64(2)(a). 
31 Id. at art. 48(2)–(3). 
32 Id. at art. 69(2). 
33 Id. at arts. 8(1), 35(3), 40, 42(1), 42(2)(a). This formulation of the knowledge test regarding the 
subjective interpretation in CISG Article 8(1) is used in the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (“Unidroit”) Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010) (“UPICC”) Article 
4.2.1 and The Principles of European Contract Law (2002) (“PECL”) Article 5:101(2). In the 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL] Article 58(2), however, 
the formulation has been changed to “aware or could be expected to be aware” and, clearly thus, to a 
simple negligence standard. 
34 CISG, supra note 1, at arts. 2(a), 9(2), 38(3), 49(2)(a)(i), 64(2)(b)(i), 68. 
35 Id. at art. 39(1). 
36 Id. at art. 8(2). 
37 Id. at art. 25. 
38 Id. at art. 43(1). 
39 Id. at art. 74. 
40 See UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG): 
COMMENTARY 529–30 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 2011), for a different understanding of the views 
expressed, which, however, does not seem to find support in doctrine, refers to a distinction in literature 
between gross negligence test and a stricter standard and, regarding the latter, states the following: 
They rely on the fact that the CISG distinguishes between the concept of “ought to have 
known,” which covers gross negligence, and the concept of “could not have been 
unaware.” The latter does not lead to any examination duties and only covers those cases 
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term could not have been unaware of is highly disputed. It can in principle 
be deemed to be identical or similar to actual knowledge (one view), an 
independent middle category between the first and third groups based on a 
degree of gross negligence (culpa lata) (second view), or identical or 
similar to constructive knowledge based only on simple negligence (culpa 
levis) (third view). These positions in the CISG doctrine reflect either a 
twofold degree of negligence (culpa lata and culpa levis) or just one overall 
degree of negligence (culpa levis). The wording of the CISG does not 
support a threefold distinction of the degrees of negligence, a degree of 
slight or the least negligence (culpa levissima) is not made part of the 
textual CISG regime. 
In some regional and domestic codifications the term “could not have 
been unaware” in CISG Article 35(3) has been changed to a wording 
thought to correspond to CISG Article 35(3) in the sense of “must be 
deemed to have known” and “aware or must have been aware.”41 Other 
domestic codifications, which to a large extent are based on the CISG and 
similar international principles, have only the twofold distinction of 
“knowledge” and “should have had” constructive knowledge based on 
simple culpa and do, thus, avoid the third category of the knowledge test 
“could not have been unware.”42 
In addition to the general threefold distinction of legal terms in the 
CISG regarding the knowledge or constructive knowledge of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
where all facts were apparent and the buyer had to draw the necessary conclusions. The 
purpose of the reference in this context is to lighten the burden of proving that the facts 
which were before the buyer’s eyes also reached his mind . . . . 
This understanding of the view expressed in doctrine seems doubtful, and moreover, confuses the 
threefold distinction of expressions on the knowledge test in the CISG. 
41 See the texts adopted in § 20(1) of the Sale of Goods Acts in Finland (1987), Sweden (1990), 
and Norway (1988): “måste antas ha känt till,” “kjenne eller atte kjenne til,” terms which in the Nordic 
travaux préparatoires of the new Nordic sales law are interpreted as “being aware of” and “have 
knowledge about” (“varit medveten om” and “har känt till”) indicating a de facto knowledge test. In 
sum, the deviation from the wording of Article 35(3) and the remarks in the Nordic travaux 
préparatoires have been a source for doubts of interpretation in Nordic law. See Fogt, supra note 13. 
42 See Tsiviilseadustiku Üldosa Seadus [TsÜS] [General Principles of the Civil Law Code] 
§ 75(1) (Est.), available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/tutvustus.html?m=3 (“A declaration of intention 
made to a certain person shall be interpreted according to the intention of the person making the 
declaration of intention if the recipient of the declaration knew or should have known such intention. If 
the recipient of the declaration did not know nor should have known the actual intention of the person 
making the declaration, the declaration of intention shall be interpreted according to the understanding 
of a reasonable person similar to the recipient under the same circumstances.”) (emphasis added). 
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contracting parties, the Convention uses related but different terms and 
formulations to express the likelihood or foreseeability of an anticipatory 
breach of contract under CISG Articles 71–73. For a contracting party to 
establish a high likelihood that a breach (or a fundamental breach) will 
occur in the future, the CISG standard for a suspension of performance is 
that “it becomes apparent” that a breach will occur;43 and for an avoidance 
of a contract, that “it is clear” or that any failure to perform subsequent 
instalments gives a party “good grounds to conclude” that a fundamental 
breach will occur.44 These are requirements for the particular situation of a 
possible anticipatory breach of contract, which relate to a different point in 
time and focus on the apparent (clear) indications of the likelihood of a 
breach of contract in the future.45 
B. The Disputed Term: “Could Not be Unaware of” 
Despite the fact that de facto knowledge required by, inter alia, the 
terms “knew” or “aware” may often be difficult to prove, the natural 
meaning is clear. The terms “ought to have” or “would have had” 
expressing ordinary negligence (culpa levis) are linguistic indicators of the 
usual formulation of the bonus pater familias, with which lawyers are 
familiar. Only five provisions in the CISG depart from these terms and 
make use of the disputed language could not have been unaware of—CISG 
Articles 8(1), 35(3), 40, 42(1), and 42(2)(a). These can be divided into three 
groups, of which the last two are closely interconnected: (1) the general 
provision on contract interpretation—CISG Article 8(1) on subjective 
“shared” intent; (2) the two specific provisions on the buyer’s knowledge, 
CISG Articles 35(3) and 42(2)(a), the caveat emptor rules; and (3) the 
provisions on the seller’s knowledge—CISG Articles 40 and 42(1)—
reflecting the caveat venditor principle.46 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 CISG, supra note 1, at art. 71. 
44 Id. at arts. 72–73. 
45 See id. at art. 71 (“after the conclusion of the contract . . . .”); id. at art. 72 (“If prior to the date 
of performance . . . .”). 
46 Note that the knowledge test in Article 42(1) is further narrowed down in the sense that it 
(only) concerns a right or claim based on two State laws: the law of the State where the goods as 
contemplated by the parties will be resold or otherwise used or the law of the State where the buyer has 
his place of business. Id. at art. 42(1). 
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The slightly different wording in the official French and Spanish 
versions of the CISG—“connaissait ou ne pouvait ignorer” and “conociera 
o no hubiera podido ignorer”—which in English literally mean knew or 
could not ignore, does not seem to imply any difference in meaning in these 
authentic texts.47 As far as the present author is aware, the official Arabic, 
Chinese, and Russian versions of the formulation likewise do not differ in 
the meaning. 
If, for the purpose of comparison, we leave out the provision on 
subjective contract interpretation of the parties’ shared intent in CISG 
Article 8(1), then the term could not have been unaware of is exclusively 
concerned with the relatively few situations where the knowledge or 
constructive knowledge of either party would deprive the other party of the 
right to claim remedies (e.g., the buyer from claiming remedies for lack of 
conformity) or of the right to escape liability (e.g., a seller from relying on 
the notice requirement for lack of conformity). The language could not have 
been unaware of is thereby used to balance the parties’ rights and 
obligations because it makes a provision, on the one hand, “buyer-friendly” 
or, on the other hand, “seller-friendly” by demanding a higher level of 
knowledge than is required under the ordinary negligence standard (culpa 
levis). Consequently, there are convincing reasons to suggest that the 
language could not have been unaware must be given the same meaning 
whether it is to the benefit of the buyer or the seller, so as not to shift the 
established balance and the ratio legis to the disadvantage of one of the 
parties to an international sales contract. 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CISG KNOWLEDGE TEST 
A knowledge test will start with a certain high-degree of subjective 
awareness (de facto knowledge) and end with a certain low-degree of 
objective (fictive), should have had, knowledge (negligent unawareness). 
Common to all legal systems since Roman law is that they operate with de 
facto knowledge and a certain degree of objective (fictive) negligent 
                                                                                                                           
 
47 See Joseph Lookofsky, Cator Can’t Compete: Caveat Emptor under CISG Article 35(3)?, in 
THE CISG CONVENTION AND DOMESTIC CONTRACT LAW, HARMONY, CROSS-INSPIRATION OR 
DISCORD? 131, 136 (Joseph Lookofsky & Mads Bryde Andersen eds., 2014) for the same conclusion 
regarding the official French text. 
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unawareness, where the latter commonly is expressed with the concept of 
the bonus pater familia (a reasonable person’s understanding in the same 
situation). However, as illustrated in the historical sketch above in Part I.C, 
the bonus pater familia (a hypothetical reasonable business man) test can be 
based on different degrees of negligence (culpa). 
In the legislative history of the knowledge test under the CISG, the 
consideration of whether different degrees of negligence (culpa) should be 
used begins with the comparative research on the sales laws that preceded 
the ULIS and the CISG, where the different views on the important 
practical issue of the effect of the buyer’s knowledge, caveat emptor rules, 
and domestic doctrines on hidden or apparent defects (vices cachés et vices 
apparentes) were investigated.48 The formulations of the caveat emptor rule 
in all the earlier drafts and in ULIS Article 36 were based on Rabel’s 
comparative studies,49 which concluded that in all continental laws, 
including Nordic laws, the buyer was precluded from claiming remedies for 
defects which he knew about or which, owing to gross negligence, he did 
not know about but should have known about. Moreover, the studies 
concluded that the (strict) caveat emptor developed in English law had lost 
much of its power owing to the recognition of implied warranties in the 
contract of sale.50 Rabel’s conclusions are important for the issue discussed 
here and are, furthermore, fine illustrations of comparative research and 
deserve to be cited directly: 
Darin nun, daß dem Käufer bekannte Mängel kein Gegenstand der 
Gewährleistung sind, stimmen alle kontinentalen Systeme überein. Aber 
während die romanischen Rechte darüber hinaus alle Mängel ausscheiden, die 
“offen” liegen, schützen die deutschen, schweizerischen und dem Grundsatz 
nach auch die skandinavischen Bestimmungen den Käufer stärker: Der Käufer 
muss nicht nur die schädliche Tatsache, sondern geradezu die Untauglichkeit als 
Wirkung der Tatsache gekannt haben; und nur grobfahrlässige Unkenntnis wird 
dieser Kenntnis gleichgestellt. Hier braucht der Käufer nicht vor Kaufabschluß 
zu untersuchen.51 
. . . . 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 See 2 ERNST RABEL, DAS RECHT DES WARENKAUFS 173 (1958). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 173–77. 
51 RABEL, supra note 48, at 173 (emphasis original). 
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Es ist hier ein besonders interessanter Fall von abweichenden Gedankengängen 
gegeben, mit denen die Gerichte der verschiedenen Länder trotzdem fast immer 
dieselben praktischen Ergebnisse erzielen. Die einzig grundlegende 
Besonderheit des Common Law ist, daß der Grundsatz caveat emptor noch 
immer gilt; aber obwohl sich dieses Prinzip noch in Entscheidungen des 20. 
Jahrhunderts bemerkbar machte, hat es doch dauernd an Bedeutung verloren.52 
Following these comparative results—which are similar to one of the 
views in doctrine on the CISG—Article 46 of the first 1935 Draft and the 
second 1939/1951 Draft of a uniform sales law did provide a buyer-friendly 
caveat emptor rule as follows: “Le vendeur n’est pas tenu à la garantie des 
defaults s’il prouve que ces derniers étaient connus de l’acheteur lors de la 
conclusion du contrat. Il en est de même si l’acheteur s’est rendu coupable, 
en les ignorant, d’une négligence grossière.”53 
From this, it is clear that the draft texts were faithful to the findings of 
the preceding comparative studies in that they provided for a caveat emptor 
knowledge test requiring that the buyer knew (“étaient connus”) about 
defects or would be culpable if he ignored the defects in a grossly negligent 
manner.54 In summing up his conclusions in 1958, Rabel did, however, find 
a caveat emptor rule based on simple negligence to be more convincing 
because the concept of gross negligence was not universal and problems of 
translation of the formulation in French could be encountered.55 Apparently, 
Article 45 of the 1956 Draft followed this recommendation: “Le vendeur 
n’est pas tenu des effets des defaults de conformité . . . , s’il prouve que, 
lors de la conclusion du contrat, l’acheteur connaissait ces defaults ou 
aurait dû les connaître; quand le vendeur a prouvé que l’acheteur, ignorant 
le défaut, aurait dû le connaître . . . .”56 
Against this background, it is possible to comprehend the achievement 
of the 1964 Hague Diplomatic Conference, which led to the adoption of the 
ULIS and the two distinct wordings on the knowledge test—in the general 
ULIS Article 13 (deleted in the CISG), on the one hand, and the specific 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 Id. at 175 (emphasis in original). 
53 Id. at 382, 402. 
54 Compare the translation of the French wording with the concerns of Rabel. See id. at 177 n.103 
(“Grobe Fahrlässigkeit ist kein universeller Begriff. Auch wäre die Wendung im Entwurf, daβ der 
Käufer ‘s’est rendu coupable,’ unübersetztbar.”). 
55 Id. at 177 (“Das Projet formuliert den Rechtssatz im Anschluβ an das deutsche Gesetzbuch; 
wird aber besser lauten: Artikel 42: . . . kannte oder kennen muβte . . . .”). 
56 Id. at 425 (emphasis added). 
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provisions in ULIS Article 36 (CISG Article 35(3)) and ULIS Article 40 
(CISG Article 40), on the other hand.57 In his commentary on ULIS Article 
36, Stumpf—with reference to the traveux préparatoires58 and German, 
English, and French doctrine—leaves no doubt about the purpose and intent 
of the formulation could not have been unaware of or ne pouvait pas 
ignorer chosen for ULIS Articles 36 and 40 in sensu that the clear ratio 
legis was to distinguish this from the simple culpa (culpa levis—ordinary 
negligence) in the general definition in ULIS Article 13.59 This purpose and 
intent of the formulation could not have been unaware of or ne pouvait pas 
ignorer is confirmed when one scrutinizes the results of the diplomatic 
negotiations in the Hague Conference of 1964 regarding ULIS Article 13 
and 36. 
At its Paris Conference in 1963, the Sales Law Committee, which had 
been tasked with considering the preconference proposals from the States 
regarding the 1956 Draft for a Uniform Sales Law, proposed including in 
the draft a definition of the meanings of the various expressions used to 
indicate what a contracting party knew or ought to have known.60 This 
proposal was made more objective with a reference to a “reasonable man” 
test and was subsequently adopted by a clear majority of the delegations. 
As the German delegate Otto Riese notes, the definition in ULIS Article 13 
was successively superseded by two later changes in the ULIS knowledge 
test concerning, firstly, the buyer and, secondly, the seller. Riese’s 
representation and explanation seem both reliable and, regarding the result, 
perfectly clear: 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 ULIS, supra note 17, at arts. 13, 36, 40. 
58 See Conférence diplomatique sur l’unification du droit en matière de la vente international, 
ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA CONFERENCE 287 (1964). 
59 Herbert Stumpf, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT 279–80 (Hans Dölle ed., 
1976) (“Diese Formulierung stehen im Gegensatz zu den Ausdrücken “wissen müssen” oder “kennen 
müssen” in Art. 13, mit denen das EKG [ULIS] die gewöhnliche Fahrlässigkeit umschreibt. Sie wurden 
gewählt, um zum Ausdruck zu bringen, daβ der Käufer, wie im deutschen Recht (§ 460 BGB) [now 
§ 442 BGB], seine Recht außer im Falle positiver Kenntnis nur dann verlieren soll, wenn er die von ihm 
zu erwartende Sorgfalt in besonders großem Maße außer acht gelassen hat . . . ergibt sich aus ihrer 
Entstehung mit hinreichender Deutlichkeit, daß nur ein solcher Grad an schuldhafter Unkenntnis der 
Vertragswidrigkeit seitens des Käufers die Verkäuferhaftung ausschließt, der als grobe Fahrlässigkeit 
einzustufen ist.”). See id. for further reference to doctrine. 
60 See Otto Riese, Verlauf der Konferenz und Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der materiellen 
Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, in 29 RABELSZ 25 (1964) (referring to the expression in German as 
“wußte oder wissen mußte”). 
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Nach der Prüfung verschiedenen Vorschläge durch eine Arbeitsgruppe wurde 
zunächst vorgesehen, daß der Käufer schon dann seiner Ansprüche verlustig 
gehen sollte, wenn er die Mängel hätte erkennen können. Erst in der 5. 
Plenarsitzung konnte die deutsche Delegation erreichen—nachdem die 
Konferenz mit der dafür erforderlichen Zweidrittelmehrheit auf deutschen 
Antrag die Wiedereröffnung der Debatte beschlossen hatte—, daß nur solche 
Mängel, die der Käufer nicht verkennen konnte (ne devait ignorer), den 
Rechtsverlust zur Folge haben. Das dürfte bedeuten, daß der Käufer seine 
Ansprüche nur verliert, wenn er den Mangel infolge bewußter grober 
Fahrlässigkeit nicht erkannt hat.61 
Die britische Delegation beantragte, statt dessen auf den Fall abzustellen, daß 
sich die Vertragswidrigkeit der Sache auf Tatsachen bezieht, die der Verkäufer 
kannte oder infolge grober Fahrlässigkeit nicht kannte.—Da der Begriff der 
“mauvaise foi” unklar erschienen . . . , wird nunmehr bestimmt, daß der 
Verkäufer sich auf Artt. 38 und 39 nicht berufen kann, wenn der Sachmangel auf 
Tatsachen beruht . . . , die der Verkäufer kannte oder nicht verkennen konnte (ne 
pouvait pas ignorer) und die er verschwiegen hat. Daß mit dem Ausdruck “ne 
pouvait pas ignorer” ein strengerer Maßstab angelegt wird, als er sich aus der 
in Art. 13 enthaltenen Formel “aurait dû connaître” ergibt, wurde bereits oben 
zu Art. 36 bemerkt.62 
First, regarding the buyer’s knowledge in the caveat emptor rule of 
ULIS Article 36, the German delegation in the last minutes finally 
succeeded in changing the knowledge test from ordinary negligence (culpa 
levis “hätte kennen müssen”) to gross negligence (culpa lata “nicht 
verkennen konnte” (ne devait ignorer)). Second, the British delegation 
changed Article 49 of the 1956 Draft (ULIS/CISG Article 40) on fraudulent 
conduct by the seller by replacing the wording mauvaise foi with the 
(allegedly clearer) wording ne pouvait pas ignorer and could not have been 
unaware of, which was meant to express gross negligence. 
Unfortunately, the definition in ULIS Article 13 was, as a 
consequence, not brought in line with the new threefold distinction of the 
expressions in the ULIS: knew and ought to have known in ULIS Article 13 
and, then, could not have been unaware of in ULIS Articles 36 and 40. 
However, according to the Commentary there is a difference between the 
general definition in ULIS Article 13 and “the more restrictive formulae 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 See id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. at 52–53 (emphasis added). 
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used in Articles 36 and 40.”63 Similarly, the ULIS doctrine supported this 
distinction between ought to have known in the sense of simple negligence 
(culpa levis) in ULIS Article 13 and could not have been unaware of as 
meaning gross negligence (culpa lata) in ULIS Articles 36 and 40.64 This 
language, which reflects a stricter knowledge-test requirement in the sense 
of gross negligence and was chosen during the negotiations in the Hague 
Convention for the ULIS, then went into the 1977 Sales Draft and the 
UNCITRAL Draft of 1978. It was thus the starting point for the discussions 
during the preparations for and at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference 1980. 
The inconsistency between the general definition in ULIS Article 13 
and the narrower knowledge test found in a few other ULIS provisions 
proved fatal at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference on the CISG. This lack 
of consistency was one of the reasons the drafters deleted the general ULIS 
Article 13 definition from the final CISG text rather than try to come up 
with an improved version.65 When deleting ULIS Article 13, the 
UNCITRAL Working Group on the CISG, based on its review and revision 
of ULIS Articles 1–17 in 1970, nevertheless decided that: 
[C]oncerning the knowledge of a party, attention should be given to the question 
whether the language appropriately expressed the standard of investigation 
required of the party in the particular circumstances of that case. In this review, 
attention should also be given to the possibility of obtaining greater uniformity 
of expression.66 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 ANDRÉ TUNC, COMMENTAIRE DES CONVENTIONS DE LA HAYE DU 1ER JUILLET 1964: SUR LA 
VENTE INTERNATIONALE DES OBJETS MOBILIERS CORPORELS ET SUR LA FORMATION DES CONTRATS DE 
VENTE 42 (1964). 
64 RONALD H. GRAVESON ET AL., THE UNIFORM LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL SALES ACT 1967, at 
74–75 (1968) (discussing ULIS Article 36 about the expression knew or could not have been unaware: 
“This is constructive notice. It covers the case of gross negligence (culpa lata) or professional 
incompetence. It is narrower than ‘ought to have known’ and appears not to include ignorance based on 
ordinary negligence (culpa levis).”) See also id. at 77 (discussing ULIS Article 40). 
65 See 1971 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. II, 60, A/CN.9/SER.A/1971. The Working 
Group recommended the deletion of ULIS Article 13 for three reasons. Firstly, the abstract concept of a 
“reasonable person” was unknown to some legal systems and the reference to a “reasonable person in 
the same situation” only indicated what a party to a sales contract in any case ought to have known and 
seemed thus rather unhelpful. Id. Secondly, the reference to “any similar expression” in the single 
definition in ULIS Article 13 seemed inappropriate to the Working Group as there was a variety of 
expressions in the ULIS on the knowledge test and, thirdly, the formulations in ULIS Articles 36 and 40 
did not seem “similar.” Id.; JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES 66–67 (1989). 
66 Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. II, supra note 65, at 60. 
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The first consideration to strike a reasonable balance between the interests 
of the buyer and of the seller in an international sales transaction seems, on 
the one hand, to be well-achieved by the expressions used in the CISG for 
the standard of the knowledge test, which limits the caveat emptor rule in 
international distance sales (buyer-friendly test) and narrows the range of 
potential situations in which the seller can be precluded from relying on the 
certainty of requirements that the buyer give notice of lack of conformity 
(seller-friendly test). The second consideration to achieve uniformity in 
expression and thus avoid doubt about the content of the CISG knowledge 
test is, on the other hand, given the current dispute in the CISG doctrine and 
inconsistency in case law, achieved to a lesser degree. 
The formulation in ULIS Article 36 knew or could not have been 
unaware of was adopted by the UNCITRAL Working Groups without any 
consideration or discussion of the content of the knowledge test, except for 
some en passant remarks found in the report by the UNCITRAL Secretary 
on the seller’s obligations in the ULIS from December 1972. The 
UNCITRAL secretary did not elaborate on the content of the knowledge 
test, referring, rather imprecisely, only to the knowledge of the buyer.67 
Late in the preconference stage before the Diplomatic Vienna 
Conference two proposals concerning Article 33(2) of the UNCITRAL 
1978 Draft (CISG Article 35(3)) were submitted and presented as follows: 
“The United Kingdom suggests deleting the words ‘or could not have been 
unaware of,’ Israel suggests replacing them by ‘or ought to have known 
of.’”68 In the end, neither proposal was maintained by the UK or Israel. As a 
result, neither the UK proposal for a general, purely de facto knowledge test 
in the CISG69 nor the Israeli proposal, which essentially reintroduced the 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 1973 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. IV, 46, A/CN.9/SER.A/1973 (referring to “the 
buyer’s knowledge of defects in the goods” and noting that “[Article 36] probably intends to provide that 
characteristics of the goods of which the buyer was aware of would not constitute a lack of 
conformity.”) (emphasis added); HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 123. 
68 United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records, 
Vienna, Mar. 10—Apr. 11, 1980, 72, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/9, available at https://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-e.pdf [hereinafter Official Records]; HONNOLD, supra 
note 65, at 398. 
69 The UK did consistently at the pre-conference stage suggest a general change and deletion of 
the term “could not have been unaware of” in the UNCITRAL 1978 Draft Articles 7(1); 38, 40 (CISG 
Article 8(1) 40, 42). Official Records, supra note 68, at 73, 77, 78; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 394, 
398–99. 
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Rabel recommendation from 1958 for ordinary/simple negligence (culpa 
levis) into the caveat emptor rule, went into the final text of CISG Article 
35(3).70 
During the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference on the CISG and the 
deliberations of the First Committee, the UNCITRAL 1978 Draft Article 33 
(CISG Article 35) was considered as the Canadian delegation proposed to 
reword UNCITRAL 1978 Draft Article 33 taking the experience of the 
common law jurisdictions into account.71 Part of the Canadian proposal 
concerned the caveat emptor rule in UNCITRAL 1978 Draft Article 33(2), 
which, according to the Canadian delegation: “[W]as much too favourable 
to the buyer. In particular, if the buyer had examined the goods or been 
given a sample, he should be deemed to have accepted the goods subject to 
such defects as a reasonable examination by him would have revealed.”72 
The Canadians’ proposed new text did not address or imply a duty to 
examine, but it did provide for a knowledge test based on simple negligence 
(“ought to have revealed”) in the case of a de facto examination conducted 
by the buyer.73 The proposal did not have enough support and was 
ultimately not maintained by the Canadian delegation.74 
Briefly stated, the cautious conclusion which can be drawn from the 
legislative history is that the knowledge test in the Rabel comparative study 
pointed to a gross negligence standard, that the early drafts of a uniform 
sales law (except for the 1958 Draft) expressly required gross negligence, 
that the traveux préparatoires to the Hague ULIS clearly support the 
purpose and intention in sensu of gross negligence in the wording could not 
have been unaware of, and that this language then went into the 
UNCITRAL 1978 Draft. Only a few suggestions at the preconference stage 
and during the Diplomatic Vienna Conference sought to change this 
approach in both a more buyer-friendly and a more seller-friendly 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 See RABEL, supra note 48, at 73–74. 
71 Official Records, supra note 68, at 308; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 529. 
72 Official Records, supra note 68, at 308 (emphasis added); HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 529. 
73 Official Records, supra note 68, at 103; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 675 (“Paragraph (2) does 
not apply, (a) as regards defects specifically drawn to the buyer’s attention before the contract was 
made; (b) if the buyer examined the goods before the contract was made, with respect to any defect that 
a reasonable examination ought to have revealed; or (c) in the case of a sale by sample or model . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
74 Official Records, supra note 68, at 315; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 529. 
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formulation, but the proposals were not maintained and in the end were not 
adopted. What came out was an unchanged knowledge test based on the 
CISG drafters understanding and intention to establish a gross negligence 
standard in CISG Articles 35(3), 40, and 42, although this is not apparent in 
the final adopted wording. 
Another important development for the discussion of the knowledge 
test under the CISG came late in the drafting process: the description of the 
test for the interpretation of the subjective intent of the contracting parties 
according to CISG Article 8(1). This essential provision has no predecessor 
in the Hague Conventions. A draft provision was proposed in Article 3(2) 
of the UNIDROIT 1972 Draft of a Law for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to the Validity of Contracts of International Sale of Goods 
(“LUV”), but first considered by the UNCITRAL after completion of the 
1976 Sales draft. The provision in LUV Article 3(2), which wording on the 
knowledge test was adopted and, thus, is identical to Article 14(2) of the 
UNCITRAL Working group Draft 1977 and Article 4(2) UNCITRAL 
Secretary Formation Draft 1978, reads as follows: 
If the actual common intent of the parties cannot be established, statements by 
and acts of the parties shall be interpreted according to the intent of one of the 
parties, where such an intent can be established and the other party knew or 
ought to have known what that intent was.75 
The change from an “ought to have known” negligence test to a different 
and presumably higher degree of negligence was first proposed during the 
UNCITRAL Commission’s deliberations on the 1978 “Formation” Draft, 
where the following two contrary proposals in favour of, on the one hand, a 
purely knowledge test and, on the other hand, a more objective (higher) 
negligence test were suggested: 
It was also noted that although a party’s subjective intent should in principle 
govern the interpretation to be given to his communication and conduct, that 
party’s intention should either appear clearly from his communication and 
                                                                                                                           
 
75 Compare Draft of a Law for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Validity of Contracts 
of International Sale of Goods, UNIDROIT, Study XVI/B, Doc. 22, U.D.P. 1972, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/1972/study16b/s-16b-22-e&f.pdf [hereinafter LUV], and 
HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 268–69, 287, with 1978 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. IX, 62, 
A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1978-e/yb_1978_ 
e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL YB IX], and HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 294–95, 367–68. 
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conduct, or he should have the burden of proving that the other party know or 
ought to have known of his intent. It was suggested that the present structure of 
article 4 could be altered by limiting the primary rule in paragraph (1) to cases 
where the other party knew of the intent . . . . 
. . . . 
It was suggested that the subjective nature of the rule on interpretation could be 
lessened if paragraph (1) was reformulated to state that communications, 
statements and declarations by and conduct of a party are to be interpreted 
according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been 
unaware what that intent was rather than referring to what the other party know 
or ought to have known . . . .76 
The 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention, which combined the Formation 
and the Sales Drafts in Article 7(1) suggests an interpretation of the party’s 
subjective intention based on a knowledge test “knew or could not have 
been unaware,” which without any change became the final adopted 
version of CISG Article 8(1). Again, late in the preconference stage before 
the Diplomatic Vienna Conference, the UK reiterated its view and 
suggestion that: “the two conditions in paragraph (1) are tautologous since, 
if a party [‘]could not have been unaware[’] of the other party’s intent, then 
he must have known what that intent was. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
second condition be deleted.”77 This proposal and other proposals for a 
simple (ordinary) negligence test in Article 8(1) CISG were, after 
discussion at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, not adopted.78 As an 
argument against the UK proposal, the Norwegian delegate Rognlien stated 
that the wording could not have been unaware of “contained a stricter 
criterion than [‘]ought to have known[’] but one that was hardly less 
objective.”79 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 UNCITRAL YB IX, supra note 75, at 34 (emphasis added); HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 368. 
77 Official Records, supra note 68, at 73; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 394. 
78 Official Records, supra note 68, at 259–60; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 480–81. 
79 Official Records, supra note 68, at 260; HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 481. 
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IV. DOCTRINE AND CASE LAW ON THE CISG CAVEAT EMPTOR 
KNOWLEDGE TEST 
A. The Two Main Views in Doctrine: Knowledge with a Relaxed Burden of 
Proof or Gross Negligence (Culpa Lata) 
For the vast majority, views in the doctrine on the CISG are divided 
into two major categories, on the one hand, based on the view that the 
knowledge test could not have been unaware of is identical or similar to 
knowledge with a relaxed burden of proof and, on the other hand, the 
independent middle category in which the knowledge test is based on a 
degree of gross negligence (culpa lata)—either gross negligence or even-
more-than-gross negligence. The latter expression of even-more-than-gross 
negligence seems difficult to distinguish from gross negligence but must be 
understood to lack the inherent subjective intent which is part of the lowest 
degrees of intention in the sense of dolus eventualis or the similar 
recklessness standard of U.S. American law. Both of these major views 
distinguish this phrase in CISG Article 35(3) from constructive knowledge 
based on simple (ordinary) negligence (culpa levis).80 This is convincing 
since the CISG does have particular and different formulations reflecting 
the simple culpa levis standard.81 Only a few voices in the doctrine 
advocate for equating the expression could not have been unaware of with 
ought to have known and similar formulations meaning simple negligence.82 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 There are a few exceptions to this division of views in the doctrine presented here. See C. 
Massimo Bianca, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 279–80 (C. Massimo Bianca & 
Michael Joachim eds., 1987) (discussing CISG Article 35(3) as “knew or ought to have known”); 
VINCENT HEUZÉ, LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES 257 n.296 (2000) (“De façon 
générale, l’article 35.3 interdit à l’achteur de se plaindre d’un défaut qu’il connaissait, ou devait 
connaître . . . les vices que l’achteur aurait dû connaître.”); see also UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG): COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 529. 
81 See supra Part II.A. 
82 See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 163 (1992) for this view 
regarding CISG Article 40. “The wording [‘]could not have been unaware[’] is defined by Huber . . . as 
being a little bit less than cunning and a little bit more than gross negligence; others treat it as being 
equivalent to gross negligence . . . . In this context it is felt that efforts are made to protect the seller 
following domestic law. The wording of the CISG itself would, in our view, include simple negligence, 
which could also be described as a violation of customary care in trade.” Id. (emphasis added). This 
does not, however, concern CISG Article 35(3) where reference is made to other views in doctrine 
requiring gross negligence or more than that or “objective and clearly recognizable deficiency.” Id. at 
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The strong view in the doctrine, which in the expression “could not 
have been unaware” finds a de facto knowledge test with a lightened 
burden of proof, was presented by the influential CISG scholar—the late 
Professor Honnold—in his textbook on the CISG, which may be regarded 
as one of the sources of the dispute about the caveat emptor knowledge test 
under the CISG. Honnold’s explanation therefore deserves citation before 
one analyzes the case law and takes a stand on the issue: 
The fact one “ought to have known” includes those facts that would be disclosed 
by an investigation or inquiry that the party should make. But an obligation 
based on facts of which one “could not have been unaware” does not impose a 
duty to investigate—these are the facts that are before the eyes of one who can 
see. This expression is used at various places in the Conventions to slightly 
lighten the burden of proving that facts that were before the eyes reached the 
mind.83 
For the purpose of this analysis, the citation from Honnold can be divided 
into two parts. The first part seems clear and convincing—a normal simple 
negligence standard would rather easily (but not necessarily) lead to the 
conclusion that an examination must be made or, at least, that an invitation 
by the seller to inspect the goods must be acted on (a pre-contractual duty to 
examine). On the contrary, this is not the case with a higher degree of 
negligence standard, which prima facie is indicated by the wording “could 
not have been unaware.” The second explanatory part, on the intention of 
the expression “could not have been unaware,” seems less clear, firstly, 
because the CISG is not concerned with procedural law or therefore with 
the evidence required to satisfy the burden of proof, and, secondly, because 
during the UNCITRAL review of the 1977 Sales Draft, inter alia, a 
proposal for a regulation of issues of evidence and the burden of proof 
regarding conformity of the goods was (rightly) not retained: “There was 
little support for this proposal as it was considered inappropriate for the 
Convention, which relates to the international sale of goods, to deal with 
                                                                                                                           
 
147–48. See also Bianca, supra note 80, at 279–80. See Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson 
Engineering Technical Supply Ltd., supra note 14, ¶ 36-41, for a discussion in case law obiter dictum of 
the wording and mental element in CISG Article 40. 
83 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 260 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis in 
original); JOHN O. HONNOLD & HARRY M. FLECHTNER, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 
339 (4th ed. 2009). See also CAMILLA BAASCH ANDERSEN ET AL., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE 
CISG 346 (2010). 
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matters of evidence or procedure. The Committee, accordingly did not 
retain the proposal.”84 
B. Leading Case Law on the Content of the Caveat Emptor Knowledge Test 
Case law addressing the exact content of the caveat emptor knowledge 
test under the CISG is rare. There are, however, decisions which point to 
the practical importance of CISG Article 35(3), though not all of these 
decisions specifically address the meaning of the term could not have been 
unaware of. Among those that do not address it are cases decided by the 
Swiss Cantonal du Valais in 1998 and by the Federal Court of Australia 
from 2011 in Castel Electronics Pty. Ltd. v. Toshiba Singapore Pte. Ltd.85 
The Australian Castel case is, however, interesting as it illuminates the role 
of the caveat emptor rule in CISG Article 35(3) by addressing the relevant 
point in time of estimating the buyers’ knowledge, the facts concerning the 
defects in the goods which this knowledge must relate to, and, thus, the 
proof which the seller must establish. Therefore, there are good reasons to 
begin the analysis of case law on Article 35(3) CISG with Castel. 
The decisions which de facto as their ratio decidendi, or at least in the 
reasoning, take a stand on or refer to the content of the knowledge test in 
CISG Article 35(3) to which one can refer, for the reasons explained below, 
include those of the German Oberlandesgericht Cologne 1996 (Used 
Mercedes Benz case);86 the Swiss Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud 1997 (Second 
hand bulldozer case);87 the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in RJ & AM 
Smallmon v. Transport Sales Ltd.;88 the English High Court of Justice in 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 See 1977 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. VIII, 37, A/CN.9/SER.A/1977; HONNOLD, 
supra note 65, at 330. 
85 Tribunal Cantonal du Valais [Canton Appellate Court] June 29, 1998, No. CI 97 288 (Switz.), 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=366&step=FullText [hereinafter 
Sports clothing case]; Castel Elecs. Pty. Ltd. v. Toshiba Singapore Pte. Ltd., (2011) FCAFC 55 (Austl.), 
available at http://www.global saleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2219.pdf. 
86 Oberlandesgericht Köln [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Cologne] May 21, 1996, No. 22 U 
4/96 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/display.cfm?test=254 [hereinafter 
Used Mercedes Benz case]. 
87 Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud [Canton Appellate Court] Oct. 28, 1997, No. C1 97 167 (Switz.), 
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/display.cfm?test=254 [hereinafter Second hand 
bulldozer case]. 
88 RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transp. Sales Ltd. [2011] NZCA 340 (N.Z.), available at http://cisgw3 
.law.pace.edu/cases/110722n6.html. 
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Kingspan Environmental Ltd. v. Borealis A/S;89 the Danish District Court 
Horsens in Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder;90 and, finally, the German 
Oberlandesgericht Koblenz (“Electricity generator case”).91 All of these 
decisions are addressed in detail. 
1. No Ratio Decidendi on the Knowledge Test 
a) 2011 Federal Court of Australia in Castel Electronics Pty. Ltd. 
v. Toshiba Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
The precedence of the decision by the Federal Court of Australia from 
2011, in the case Castel Electronics Pty. Ltd. v. Toshiba Singapore Pte. 
Ltd., remains in doubt because the court refers to and only interprets the 
term “knew” from CISG Article 35(3) and, thus, leaves it unclear whether 
its interpretation extends to the language “could not have been unaware 
of.”92 This is surprising since the seller grounded its appeal on the court’s 
failure to apply CISG Article 35(3) in its entirety.93 The precedence of this 
Australian case should therefore be dealt with separately and in more detail 
                                                                                                                           
 
89 Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S, supra note 16. 
90 Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder, Retten i Horsens [District Court] Dec. 7, 2012, BS 150-
1320/2010 (Den.), abstract of case, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/121207d1.html. 
91 Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Koblenz] Dec. 19, 2010, No. 2 U 
1464/11 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/121219g2.html [hereinafter Electricity 
generator case]. 
92 Castel Elecs. Pty. Ltd. v. Toshiba Singapore Pte. Ltd., supra note 85, at 140. See also 
Lookofsky, supra note 47, ¶ 140 (discussing Castel). 
93 Castel, supra note 85, ¶ 140 (“[Seller’s] Notice of Cross Appeal contains 29 separate grounds 
of appeal. The grounds may be summarized within six broad grounds: (a) the primary judge failed to 
apply Article 35(3) of CISG”) (emphasis added). See also id. ¶ 286 (“[Seller] filed a cross appeal in 
which it argues that: 1. The primary judge erred in failing to address [Seller’s] submission that, by 
reason of art 35(3) of the CISG, [Seller] was not liable to [Buyer] for any lack of conformity of the set-
top boxes because at the time of the conclusion of each relevant contract, [Buyer] knew, or could not 
have been unaware of a lack of conformity in each and every relevant set-top box within the meaning of 
art 35(3) of the CISG.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 288 (“In response to [Seller’s] cross appeal, [Buyer] 
argues that: 1. When each contract was entered into for the purchase of the J35s, the C26s or the DLPs, 
[Buyer] did not know, and could not have been aware, of a lack of conformity in each and every set-top 
box within the meaning of art 35(3) of the CISG. Castel submits that the trial judge found Mr. Hew to be 
a ‘careful and impressive witness’ whose evidence established that [Buyer] did no more in regard to the 
testing than merely facilitate the work of [Seller] and its contractor, Zinwell. Once [Buyer] became 
aware of the defects, it halted supply until it was informed by [Seller] that the defects had been 
rectified.”) (emphasis added). 
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first because it must be distinguished from cases that in their ratio 
decidendi do take a stand on the knowledge test in CISG Article 35(3). 
The Castel case concerned a lack of conformity in a new and improved 
high-capacity version of the seller’s set-top box, which the seller (TSP) had 
described as being capable of receiving high-definition television digital 
signals in all Australian display formats.94 The CISG Article 35(3) question 
was, did the Australian buyer (Castel) at the time it ordered each 
consignment know or could it not have been unaware of particular defects 
in the concrete lot of improved (type J35) and in later new versions (type 
C26) of set-top boxes?95 There had been series of deliveries of 
consignments under separate contracts, and the buyer had already received 
several consumer claims of lack of conformity in the set-top boxes from the 
first batch.96 The seller attempted to correct the problem and believed that it 
had mitigated it each time, expressly informing and reassuring the buyer to 
that effect on several occasions.97 The ratio decidendi of the decision 
regarding CISG Article 35(3) is therefore not focused on the content of the 
knowledge test but instead, firstly, on the relevant point in time for the 
estimation of the buyer’s knowledge and, secondly, the importance of the 
seller’s reassurance before each consignment that the problem had been 
solved.98 There was, consequently, no reason for the court to elaborate on 
the exact content of the knowledge test; moreover, the court did, de facto, 
make reference both to what the buyer “knew, or must have been aware of”: 
The cross-examination of Mr. Hew elicited admissions by Mr. Hew that after 
J35 units were received by Castel from TSP, Castel on-sold some of them, even 
though they were affected by defects. Mr. Hew did not admit that there were 
serious defects in all such units; and the questions were focussed upon his 
knowledge of defects after receipt, and before on-sale, not upon the material 
time, which was when Castel and TSP contracted for the supply of any particular 
batch. It did not seek to elicit admissions that Mr. Hew knew, or must have been 
aware of, defects in all the J35 units, the subject of each order, at the time the 
orders were placed by Castel. The cross-examination was not targeted with 
sufficient precision to engage the operation of Article 35(3). TSP failed to 
establish that the particular defects which gave rise to the lack of conformity in 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 Id. ¶ 9. 
95 Id. ¶ 286. 
96 Id. ¶¶ 12–18. 
97 Id. 
98 But see Lookofsky, supra note 47, at 140 (taking a different view on the case). 
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respect of which Castel sued TSP were known to Castel at the time each batch of 
goods was ordered by it.99 
From the court’s reasoning it follows, firstly, that a buyer’s general 
knowledge of defects is insufficient for the caveat emptor preclusion of 
remedies and, consequently, that the burden of proof on the seller must be 
established “with sufficient precision to engage the operation of Article 
35(3).”100 The knowledge or constructive knowledge of the CISG buyer 
must concern particular defects in the goods sold under a particular contract 
or consignment. 
Under the caveat emptor rule in Article 35(3), this knowledge must, 
secondly, be given and proven “upon the material time,” that is, at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract.101 This means that the contract-formation 
regime in CISG Part II is of paramount importance in order to determine 
the relevant point in time. This regime is, however, challenged by the 
modern means of contract formation and, in addition, the modern means of 
instant electronic communication.102 In the following sections, the focus is 
on decisions which either directly or indirectly address the meaning of the 
language “could not have been unaware.” 
2. A Gross Negligence Test 
a) 1996 German OLG Cologne (Used Mercedes Benz Case): A 
Gross Negligence Test 
In the first decision, rendered by the 1996 German OLG Cologne in 
Used Mercedes Benz case, the court equated the term “nicht in Unkenntnis 
sein konnte” in CISG Article 35(3) with gross negligence as follows: 
Bei Arglist des Verkäufers ist aus dem Grundgedanken des Artikel 40 CISG, 
wonach der Verkäufer sich nicht auf ein Verhalten des Käufers berufen kann, 
wenn ihn selber ein größerer Vorwurf trifft, in Verbindung mit Artikel 7 Abs. 1 
CISG zu folgern, daß der Verkäufer selbst dann einzustehen hat, wenn der 
Käufer über den Mangel nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte . . . Selbst der grob 
                                                                                                                           
 
99 Castel, supra note 85, ¶ 313 (emphasis added). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See Morten M. Fogt, Contract Formation under the CISG: The Need for a Reform, in 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 179 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014). 
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fahrlässig unwissende Käufer erscheint schutzwürdiger als der arglistig 
handelnde Verkäufer.103 
The court first cites the unofficial German version of “could not have been 
unaware” (“nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte”) and, thereafter, refers to this 
language and the stage of knowledge it expresses as “being gross 
negligently unaware” (“grob fahrlässig unwissende”).104 It is certain that 
the court understood the constructive knowledge in CISG Article 35(3) as 
such. 
b) 1997 Swiss Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud (Second Hand 
Bulldozer Case): Presumably a Gross Negligence Test 
The next case involving an interpretation of “could not have been 
unaware” in CISG Article 35(3) is the decision of Swiss Tribunal Cantonal 
de Vaud in Second hand bulldozer case.105 The buyer, in his capacity as a 
professional contractor (entrepreneur) had, prior to the conclusion of the 
contract, inspected and tested the bulldozer, and the parties had agreed that 
the seller had an obligation to cure three specific, expressly mentioned 
defects.106 The court’s reasoning was therefore based on the principle of the 
caveat emptor doctrine. The court held: 
Au demeurant, en tant qu’entrepreneur, le demandeur avait conscience de la 
qualité de l’objet vendu. Or, à l’occasion de l’essai du “bulldozer,” ce dernier 
n’a fait valoir aucun défaut et a accepté l’offre de la défenderesse. Dès lors, 
cette dernière est, de toute façon, exonérée de sa responsabilité (art. 35 al. 3 
CVIM).107 
From this excerpt of the court’s reasoning it is clear that the court 
concluded that the buyer—in his capacity as a professional contractor—
knew of the quality of the purchased bulldozer. Nevertheless, he did not at 
the time of the inspection claim any defects but instead accepted the seller’s 
offer. Consequently, the court did not state that at the time of the inspection 
the buyer had de facto knowledge of the specific defects in the bulldozer he 
                                                                                                                           
 
103 Used Mercedes Benz case, supra note 86, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
104 Id. 
105 Second hand bulldozer case, supra note 87. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
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later alleged but, instead, that he had only a general knowledge of the 
quality of the bulldozer.108 Thus, other defects should, after his professional 
inspection, have been obvious (apparent) to him.109 With good reason, it 
could therefore be argued that the buyer lacked knowledge of the defects 
due to gross negligence (“could not have been unaware”) and therefore, at 
the time of inspection and before the contract conclusion, should have 
raised the quality issue with the seller. In other words, the court’s decision 
should not be interpreted as being based on the buyer’s knowledge of the 
concrete defects.110 In the end, the professional buyer bought, after prior 
examination, a second-hand bulldozer repaired as the parties had agreed, 
and this was what he received. 
c) 2011 Court of Appeal of New Zealand in RJ & AM Smallmon 
v. Transport Sales Ltd.: An Obiter Dictum Indicating a Gross Negligence 
Test 
In the 2011 decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in RJ & 
AM Smallmon v. Transport Sales Ltd., the court based its reasoning on the 
caveat emptor principle but did not expressly refer to Article 35(3) or 
address the test for the Australian buyer’s constructive knowledge.111 
Instead, the case was decided on the basis of the default conformity 
provision in CISG Article 35(2) applying the principles laid down by the 
German Bundesgerichtshof (“BGH”) in the leading New Zealand mussels 
case.112 Although the caveat emptor issue was not put to the court in the 
parties’ pleadings in Smallmon, in deciding the case, the court did consider 
the implications of the buyer’s constructive knowledge of the fact that the 
compliance plates on the trucks were missing, which “was not kept from 
them” and “was there for them (and anyone else) to see”: 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See differently Lookofsky, supra note 47, at 139, who interprets the decision to support the 
view that the term “could not be unaware of” equals awareness (de facto knowledge). 
111 RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transp. Sales Ltd., supra note 88. See also Petra Butler, New Zealand, 
in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 539, 544–46 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014) 
(commenting on Smallmon regarding application of the conformity rule in Article 35(2)). 
112 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 75 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/950308g3.html [hereinafter New Zealand mussels case]. 
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Another circumstance that we consider to be material is the knowledge and 
experience of [the buyers]. As the Judge found, they were experienced transport 
operators. Hence they were in a much better position than Mr. Miller [the seller] 
to know the registration requirements of their own country. Moreover, having 
received preliminary expert advice from Mr. Walsh about matters to watch out 
for, they had the opportunity to (and did) inspect the four trucks in New Zealand. 
The fact that the trucks did not have compliance plates on them was not kept 
from them. It was there for them (and anyone else) to see. The Judge was 
satisfied that, given their experience, they could be expected to be able to 
identify the presence or absence of a compliance plate. We agree.113 
From the court’s statement and language it may be assumed that the caveat 
emptor rule could have been successfully invoked as there were evident 
facts relating to the impossibility of importing the trucks to Australia, which 
were before the eyes of the experienced buyer inspecting the trucks. 
Although placed in an obiter dictum and not directly related to a discussion 
of the caveat emptor rule in CISG Article 35(3), the facts of the case and 
the reasoning of the court are not much different from a gross negligence 
caveat emptor test “could not be unaware.” The decision still remains a 
weak precedent for the caveat emptor rule in the CISG, as it was only an 
additional circumstance considered by the court. 
d) 2011 German OLG Koblenz (Clay case OLG) and 2012 BGH 
(Clay case BGH): A Gross Negligence Test 
The question on the knowledge test in CISG Article 35(3) was 
considered by the German Oberlandesgericht (“OLG”) Koblenz in its 
decision from 2011 (“Clay case OLG”).114 The Clay case appeal to the 
Bundesgerichtshof (“BGH”) (“Clay case BGH”) was based on other non-
caveat emptor issues and therefore did not necessitate that the BGH take a 
stand on the CISG Article 35(3) issue.115 A German seller’s delivery of 
dioxin-contaminated clay to a Dutch buyer for use in a potato separation 
                                                                                                                           
 
113 RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transp. Sales Ltd., supra note 88, ¶ 66 (emphasis added). 
114 Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Koblenz] Feb. 24, 2011, No. 6 
U555/07 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/2301.pdf [hereinafter 
Clay case OLG]. 
115 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 26, 2012, No. VIII ZR 100/11 
(Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/2348.pdf [hereinafter Clay case 
BGH]. 
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process could, depending on the expected subsequent use of the potatoes for 
human consumption or in animal feed and on whether the separation 
process included or did not include a cleaning procedure, constitute a lack 
of conformity.116 There was no express agreement on conformity between 
the parties, only a European Commission Safety Data Sheet marked “non-
toxic,” a required public safety document not indicating any specific 
requirement concerning the conformity of the clay.117 Therefore, the 
decision of the OLG Koblenz and the BGH to a large extent depended on 
the information exchanged by the parties and the de facto and constructive 
knowledge of the parties regarding the elevated dioxin levels and the 
expected use by the buyer. The OLG Koblenz left the question of the 
conformity of the dioxin-contaminated clay open but held that if the dioxin 
could not be easily removed, the delivered clay would be non-
conforming.118 In the reasoning on this possible outcome of the conformity 
dispute, the OLG Koblenz discussed the caveat emptor rule and referred to 
the knowledge test in CISG Article 35(3), as follows: 
Der Ton entsprach also, wenn Dioxinrückstände sich nicht ohne Schwierigkeiten 
entfernen ließen, nach Art. 35 Abs. 2 Buchst. a CISG nicht dem Vertrag. Dass 
die Klägerin bei Vertragsschluss von diesem Mangel gewusst hätte oder 
hierüber nicht in Unkenntnis hätte sein können (Art. 35 Abs. 3 CISG), d. h., dass 
ihre Unkenntnis auf grober Fahrlässigkeit beruhte . . . , ist auszuschließen.119 
The OLG Koblenz referred to the disputed wording “could not have been 
unaware” of CISG Article 35(3) in the correct unofficial German translation 
and expressis verbis defined the unawareness as based on gross negligence. 
Even though the dioxin contamination of clay was well-known to the public 
and multiple public law measures addressing the issue had been enacted at 
the time of conclusion of the contract, the Dutch buyer was not held to be 
grossly negligent.120 A general awareness of market conditions and the 
current contamination problems from reports in the public media rightly 
does not lead to any knowledge or grossly negligent ignorance of a 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 Id. 
117 Id. ¶ 29. 
118 Clay case OLG, supra note 114. This rather narrow construction of the default conformity rule 
in CISG Article 35(2)(a) was changed by the BGH on appeal. Clay case BGH, supra note 115, ¶¶ 19–
21. 
119 Clay case OLG, supra note 114, at 11 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. 
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contamination of a particular delivery of clay. The knowledge test of the 
caveat emptor rule must relate to the concrete consignment and to the 
specific nature of the non-conformity. 
e) 2012 Danish District Court in Julie George v. Kristian 
Skovridder: A Test of a Higher Degree of Negligence 
The interesting unpublished Danish District Court decision from 2012 
in Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder is in line with previous CISG case 
law regarding the knowledge test in CISG Article 35(3) and the meaning of 
the phase “could not have been unaware,” as the court specifically refers to 
“a degree of negligence” in the caveat emptor rule of CISG Article 35(3).121 
Unlike in Castel, discussed above, the ratio decidendi of the decision in the 
Julie George was specifically about the knowledge test in CISG Article 
35(3). The Danish court—again, unlike the Federal Court of Australia in 
Castel—started by citing the relevant wording (in casu the unofficial 
Danish translation) of this part of CISG Article 35(3): “kendte eller kunne 
ikke være uvidende om” (the correct translation of “could not have been 
unaware of”).122 
In Julie George, a Canadian buyer, on November 30, 2009, bought two 
horses (named Cator and Ferrari) from a professional Danish horse dealer 
for 1,150,000 euros, of which the price for Cator was 550,000 euros.123 The 
father of the buyer employed a professional Canadian horse trading agent, 
who specialized in jumping horses, to find a suitable jumping horse for his 
daughter, a full-time equestrian who competed at the highest levels in 
international jumping competitions and whose goal was to qualify for the 
2012 Olympic Cames in London.124 Before concluding the sale, both the 
father and the buyer (the daughter) and the Canadian professional agent had 
inspected the horse, and the daughter had also taken several test rides on 
Cator.125 In addition, the buyer engaged a Canadian veterinarian to examine 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder, supra note 90. See also Lookofsky, supra note 47, at 140 
(commenting on Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder). 
122 Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder, supra note 90. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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Cator.126 This examination had taken place on November 24, 2009 at a 
Danish animal hospital.127 The veterinarian issued a report to the buyer 
based in part on 30 x-rays of Cator’s forefeet.128 Cator was delivered to the 
buyer in Denmark on December 9, 2009 and then transported to Canada.129 
Shortly thereafter, on January 2, 2010, Cator proved to have a serious 
problem in his right forefoot.130 The buyer had Cator examined by a 
different Canadian veterinarian on January 5, 2010, and on January 7, 2010, 
gave the seller the specified notice of lack of conformity.131 On January 16, 
2010, the buyer, in an e-mail to the seller, declared the avoidance of the 
contract for Cator.132 A dispute arose between the parties concerning inter 
alia the buyer’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of Cator’s lack of 
conformity as a jumping horse.133 
Unfortunately, the pleadings of the parties were not helpful in guiding 
the court because both parties treated the transaction for Cator as both a 
consumer sale and as a commercial sale under the CISG; nor did either 
party relate its arguments to the dispute over the interpretation of the phrase 
“could not have been unaware” in CISG Article 35(3). Instead, the 
pleadings of both parties referred several times to the simple negligence 
standard without addressing the interpretation of the CISG language “could 
not have been unaware” and the exact degree of negligence required.134 
Admittedly, the reasoning of the Danish court could have been more precise 
and would have been improved if the court had clearly distinguished the 
interpretation of the terms “knew” and “could not have been unaware” 
instead of referring to an (undefined) degree of negligence. However, the 
court did not base its decision on the parties’ arguments about simple 
negligence (in Danish, burde vide; in English, “ought to have known”), but 
made reference to “such a degree of negligence” and found that the buyer 
                                                                                                                           
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 25–26, 30–32. 
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by virtue of CISG Article 35(3) had not acted with such a degree of 
negligence as to preclude her from remedial relief for nonconformity: 
Under the described circumstances the court cannot conclude that [the buyer] 
knew or could not have been unaware of Cator’s disorders or predisposition for 
those disorders, nor that [the buyer], moreover, had exhibited such a degree of 
negligence that she by virtue of CISG Article 35(3) is precluded from asserting 
remedies for lack of conformity.135 
This reasoning by the District Court—though it is somewhat unclearly 
divided into two reasons regarding, first, the wording “knew or could not 
have been unaware” and second a gross negligence standard in CISG 
Article 35(3)—can only be interpreted to mean that the court found the 
knowledge test in the CISG to be based on the buyer’s knowledge or 
grossly negligent ignorance of the competition horse’s (Cator’s) disorder or 
predisposition for such disorders. 
Firstly, the District Court did expressly refer to and cite the unofficial 
Danish translation of CISG Article 35(3), which does not use the Danish 
term for simple negligence burde vide (ought to know) and burde have vidst 
(ought to have known), but instead correctly makes use of the different 
expression ikke kunne have været uvidende om (could not have been 
unaware of). Secondly, in its reasoning, the District Court not only 
addressed “knowledge” but also went into a detailed discussion of the 
concepts of both negligence and the concrete degree of negligence. This can 
only be explained, and only makes sense, if the court was of the opinion 
that such an investigation de lege lata was necessary, and that the facts of 
the case in concreto demonstrated a form of negligence on the part of the 
buyer that needed to be evaluated. Moreover, the District Court did not 
engage in a discussion of proof or of a relaxed proof of the buyer’s 
knowledge. 
Thirdly, the judge went on to evaluate the possible negligence by the 
Canadian veterinarian engaged by the Canadian buyer who had examined 
Cator at the animal hospital in Denmark. It is not only the buyer’s personal 
negligence or that of her father but also that of a third party engaged by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
135 Id. at 40 (“Under de beskrevne omstændigheder kan retten ikke fastslå, at Julie George kendte 
eller ikke kunne være uvidende om Cators lidelser eller prædisponeringen herfor, eller at hun i øvrigt har 
udvist en sådan grad af uagtsomhed, at hun i medfør af CISG artikel 35, stk. 3, er afskåret fra at gøre 
mangelsindsigelser gældende.”) (translation by author) (emphasis added). 
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buyer which is decisive.136 In fact, the District Court based its conclusion 
on the evidence provided by a court-appointed Danish veterinarian, who 
testified that there was negligence by the Canadian veterinarian and, 
consequently, in concreto by the buyer. It was the opinion of the court-
appointed Danish veterinarian that the Canadian veterinarian should have 
conducted or initiated additional examinations and observations of Cator in 
order to have sufficient grounds for concluding that the horse was fit for 
high-level jumping competitions. According to the report and testimony of 
the Danish veterinarian, his findings could support both an insignificant and 
a quite important observation of lack of conformity.137 Even though the 
court did not find any negligence by the buyer herself during the test rides, 
it did find evidence of negligence by the buyer’s professional Canadian 
veterinarian in conducting the physical examination and observation of the 
horse; such negligence, however, did not, in the author’s interpretation of 
the court’s reasoning, amount to such a degree of negligence as required in 
CISG Article 35(3). As a result, there was merely simple (ordinary) but no 
gross negligence on the part of the buyer. 
3. The “Must Not Obtrude or Impose” Test—2013 OLG Koblenz 
(Electricity Generator Case) 
In the reasoning of the OLG Koblenz in Electricity generator case, 
there is implicit support for the view that the knowledge test in CISG 
Article 35(3) in fact depends not only on knowledge but also on what 
should have appeared before the eyes of the buyer but did not due to a 
degree of gross negligence.138 Electricity generator case concerned a 
German seller’s sale of an electricity generator to a Czech buyer.139 
According to the seller’s internet advertisement, the generator had a “300 
                                                                                                                           
 
136 See supra Part II (referencing further case law). 
137 Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder, supra note 90, at 40 (“Endelig har skønsmanden, både i 
sine erklæringer og under sin forklaring i retten, anført, at dr. Michael Scott burde have foretaget eller 
foranlediget yderligere undersøgelser samt observation af Cator over tid, førend han kunne have 
tilstrækkeligt grundlag for at vurdere, om Cator var egnet som springhest på højt niveau. Skønsmanden 
har videre anført, at de konstateringer, dr. Michael Scott gjorde, både kunne forenes med en antagelse 
om, at det var ubetydelige fund, og med en antagelse om, at det var ret alvorlige fund.”) (emphasis 
added). 
138 Electricity generator case, supra note 91, at 4. 
139 Id. 
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KVA, 361 Ampere” output.140 However, this output could be achieved only 
with the electricity supply on the American market and not in Europe.141 
The court therefore found a lack of conformity under CISG Article 35(1) 
because when used in Europe, the generator’s output was 20% lower than 
advertised (with Europe’s 400/230 V electricity supply, the output was only 
250 KVA).142 After the court found there was a lack of conformity under 
CISG Article 35(1), the decisive question was whether the Czech buyer 
under the caveat emptor rule could hold the German seller liable for the 
non-conformity.143 The literal reasoning of the court on Article 35(3) CISG 
should be consulted: 
Die Klägerin [the buyer] muss sich auch nicht vorhalten lassen, dass sie über die 
Vertragswidrigkeit des Generators nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte (vgl. Art. 35 
Abs. 3 CISG). So musste sich ihr—entgegen der Auffassung der Beklagten [the 
seller]—aus der Angabe von 361 Ampere in der Internet-Anzeige nicht 
aufdrängen, dass der Generator über eine Leistung von 300 KVA gar nicht 
verfügen konnte. So gibt die Beklagte [the seller] selbst in ihrer 
Berufungsbegründung an, dass in der Maschinenbeschreibung “richtigerweise 
die Leistung mit 300 KVA bei 361 Ampere angegeben” worden sei (vgl. Bl. 107 
d.A.). 
Ebenso wenig bestand angesichts der eindeutigen technischen Vorgaben in der 
Internet-Anzeige eine Verpflichtung der Klägerin [the buyer], bei der vorherigen 
Besichtigung des Generators nach eventuell daran befindlichen Typenschildern 
zu suchen und die Angaben der Beklagten [the seller] insoweit zu verifizieren.144 
The court’s statements go directly to the interpretation of the wording 
“could not have been unaware” (in the German unofficial translation—nicht 
in Unkenntnis sein konnte). The interesting parts of the courts’ reasoning 
(here emphasized) are twofold. 
First, the OLG Koblenz does not discuss or even consider that the 
meaning of “could not have been unaware of” could be identical or similar 
(close) to knowledge in the sense that knowledge of the defect reasonably 
can be inferred, if not proven. The judges, apparently, presume that the 
meaning is different from de facto knowledge and turn to a discussion about 
                                                                                                                           
 
140 Id. at 2. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 4. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (emphasis added). 
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whether the information about capacity provided by the seller in the internet 
advertisement was so obviously unclear or incorrect that the buyer (i.e., a 
prudent buyer) must to some degree have noticed (“sich aufdrängen”). 
Second, concerning the knowledge test in CISG Article 35(3), the use 
of the German verb musste . . . nicht aufdrängen (must not obtrude or 
impose) with respect to what the internet information did not obtrude upon 
the buyer concerning the generators’ capability, indicates that the court 
demanded a clear and easily recognizable indication or facts in order to find 
that the buyer “could not be unaware.”145 This language is close to a gross 
negligence standard, which in fact the OLG Koblenz in its earlier decision 
from 2011 found expressed in CISG Article 35(3).146 The court rejected any 
duty of the buyer to inspect or to seek verification of the unclear 
information provided online.147 
V. DOCTRINE AND CASE LAW ON THE KNOWLEDGE TEST FOR SELLER IN 
ARTICLE 40 CISG 
A. The Prevailing View in Doctrine Supporting a Gross Negligence Test 
The knowledge test for the seller in CISG Article 40 is literally 
identical to that of the buyer in the caveat emptor rule in CISG Article 
35(3). CISG Article 40 states: “The seller is not entitled to rely on the 
provisions of articles 38 and 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of 
which he knew or could not have been unaware and which he did not 
disclose to the buyer.”148 
There are good reasons for the identical wording of the knowledge 
tests in CISG Articles 35(3) and 40. This knowledge or constructive 
knowledge of the parties to a sales contract will determine their right to 
                                                                                                                           
 
145 Cf. M. Schmidt-Kessel, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) 203 
(Peter Schlechtriem et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013) (suggesting the expression “sich geradezu aufdrängte” as 
the interpretation of the knowledge test, “could not have been unaware of,” in CISG Article 8(1)). See 
also Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Koblenz] Sept. 11, 1998, No. 2 U 
580/96 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/505.htm (employing the 
same formulation in its decision on CISG Article 40). 
146 Clay case OLG, supra note 114. 
147 Electricity generator case, supra note 91. 
148 CISG, supra note 1, at art. 40. 
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remedies or to relief of liability. It is therefore justified to demand either 
actual knowledge or a certain high degree of negligence (culpa) which, 
then, in exceptional cases, overrides the otherwise available default rights 
of a party—by precluding the buyer from claiming lack of conformity and 
by precluding the seller from relying on the provisions for timely notice of 
lack of conformity. To balance the rights and obligations of the parties the 
standard should be the same for both.149 
The doctrine under the ULIS150 and CISG has convincingly made a 
consistent interpretation of the knowledge test in CISG Article 35(3) and 40 
(as well as Article 8(1) and 42).151 The difference is that under the ULIS, 
the doctrine was almost in agreement about a gross negligence (culpa lata) 
standard in ULIS Articles 36 and 40, whereas under the CISG, the doctrine 
on CISG Article 40 is split into the same two divergent approaches for 
interpretations of the knowledge test of the caveat emptor under CISG 
Article 35(3).152 The presumptively prevailing view in the CISG doctrine 
supports a gross negligence knowledge test in CISG Article 40,153 but as the 
Israeli Supreme Court emphasized in its decision in 2009 in Pamesa 
Ceramica, the CISG doctrine does not give courts or tribunals clear 
guidance.154 In Pamesa Ceramica, the Israeli buyer (Mendelson) actually 
                                                                                                                           
 
149 See supra Part I.A (discussing the balancing requirement of a sales law regime). 
150 See TUNC, supra note 63, at 42; GRAVERSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 74–75, 77; Stumpf, 
supra note 59, at 279–80, 291. 
151 See, e.g., Ulrich Magnus, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZE, WIENER UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) 503–04 (Julius von 
Staudinger ed., 2013) (referencing further doctrine and case law). Even though some of the larger CISG 
commentaries with independent contributions from authors have different views of the interpretation of 
the wording “could not have been unaware” in CISG Articles 8, 35, 40 and 42, this does in principle not 
imply that each author would employ the different meaning of the same expression throughout the 
convention. Compare Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 145, at 203 (“ein gesteigertes Maß an 
Sorgfaltswidrigkeit verstanden, welches in der deutschsprachigen Literatur regelmäßig mit grober 
Fahrlässigkeit gleichgesetzt wird.”), with Ingeborg Schwenzer, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN 
UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) 594–95, 649 (Peter Schlechtriem et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013) (“mehr als grobe 
Fahrlässigkeit . . . Insoweit stellt die Formuliering eine Beweiserleichterung . . . dar.”). 
152 See Magnus, supra note 151, at 530 for a knowledge test based on gross negligence. See also 
Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 649 (discussing a gross negligence standard). Other commentary is in 
favor of a de facto knowledge test with a relaxed burden of proof for the buyer. See HONNOLD, supra 
note 83, at 260; HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 83, at 33; JAN RAMBERG & JOHNNY HERRE, 
INTERNATIONAELLA KÖPLAGEN (CISG) 264 (2001). 
153 See Magnus, supra note 151, at 503–04. 
154 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Engineering Technical Supply Ltd., supra note 14, 
¶¶ 36–38. 
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knew about the non-conformity for almost three years before it gave notice 
(far too late) to the Spanish seller (Pamesa), and neither knowledge nor 
negligent ignorance of the concrete lack of conformity of the specific 
consignment on the part of the seller could be demonstrated.155 Therefore, 
the Spanish seller—as the Israeli Supreme Court rightly held—was not 
precluded from relying on CISG Article 39 because “a general awareness 
of ‘problems’ that were discovered in the past, without any specific notice 
being given by a buyer with regard to the specific goods, does not satisfy 
the requirements of art[icle] 40.”156 
B. Ratio Legis of CISG Article 40—The Principle of Good Faith 
Under both the ULIS and the CISG there is agreement about the 
underlying ratio of Article 40 in the ULIS and CISG that it is an expression 
of the principle of good faith and, thus, of the contracting parties’ obligation 
to cooperate and to exchange important information.157 If a seller failed to 
disclose lack of conformity that it de facto knew or could not have been 
unaware (ignorant) of at the time of the contract conclusion and at the same 
time, attempts to rely on the buyer’s failure to give timely notice of the lack 
of conformity, the seller would indeed be acting in bad faith or constructive 
bad faith. No sales law could reasonably protect a seller, who with full 
knowledge or a high degree of negligence, performs a sales contract with 
unsuitable (unfit) goods and then alleges a too-late notice thereof to avoid 
liability.158 The ICC International Court of Arbitration in 1999—while 
deciding the case under “the general standards and rules of international 
                                                                                                                           
 
155 Id. ¶ 35. 
156 Id. ¶ 45. 
157 See TUNC, supra note 63, at 63 (“[ULIS] Article 40 does no more than sanction a rule of good 
faith.”) (emphasis added); GRAVERSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 77 (taking a similar view on ULIS 
Article 40). BERNARD AUDIT, LA VENTE INTERNATIONAL DE MARCHANDISES 108 n.112 (2000) 
(discussing CISG Article 40); Magnus, supra note 151, at 502 (“Grundsätzen redlichen 
Geschäftsverkehrs”). 
158 See, e.g., Landgericht Trier [LG] [District Court] Oct. 12, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCRIFT-RECHTSPRECHUNG REPORT [NJW-RR] 564 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-
online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/160.htm [hereinafter Wine case] (“Im übrigen kann die Klägerin sich 
gemäß Art. 40 CISG vorliegend nicht auf die Art. 38 und 39 CISG berufen, weil die Vertragswidrigkeit 
auf Tatsachen beruht, die sie kannte oder über die sie nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte und die sie der 
Käuferin nicht offenbart hat; die Lieferung eines mit Wasser versetzten Weins, der nicht verkehrsfähig 
ist, stellt nämlich ein arglistiges Verhalten dar.”). 
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contracts”—made an award in which it held with reference to CISG Article 
40 that: 
It is a general recognized principle of commercial law that a vendor cannot rely 
on a buyer’s failure to inspect the goods and to give timely notice of defects, if 
the vendor has adopted a conduct which is not in conformity with his own 
duties. Especially, it is generally admitted that the vendor is precluded from 
asserting the non-conformity of the notice if it has concealed the existence of the 
defect.159 
When there is evidence of undisclosed knowledge of a defect on the part of 
the seller and, thus, of bad faith on the part of the seller, the principle of 
good faith will override the knowledge or constructive knowledge of a 
buyer that would in principle activate the caveat emptor rule in CISG 
Article 35(3).160 Still, however, CISG Article 40 must be applied only in 
exceptional cases in order to maintain certainty in international trade and to 
protect the seller’s reasonable expectations that past sales transactions are 
closed if he or she has not received notice of non-conformity issues.161 
Hence, it is also required that the CISG buyer act in good faith and give the 
seller immediate notice or notice “within reasonable time” of any lack of 
conformity. This, then, enables the seller to take precautions, consider a 
possible cure, and secure remedies against his counterparts by giving third 
parties timely notice. The principle of good faith and fair dealing does not 
go only one way; it is two-sided. 
C. Cautious Favouring of a De Facto Knowledge Test—2012 English High 
Court of Justice in Kingspan Environmental Ltd. v. Borealis A/S 
In 2012, the English High Court of Justice in Kingspan v. Borealis 
introduced the two possible interpretations of the CISG Article 40 
                                                                                                                           
 
159 Case No. 9474 of 1999, 12 ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb. Bull. 64, ¶ 16 (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.), available at 
http://www.uni lex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=716&step=FullText. 
160 Used Mercedes Benz case, supra note 86, ¶ 2. 
161 See Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, June 5, 1998, ¶ 6.3(b), available at http://www.cisg.law 
.pace.edu/cases/980605s5.html (“Article 40 of CISG should only be applied in special circumstances.”); 
Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Engineering Technical Supply Ltd., supra note 14, ¶¶ 34–35. 
See also Yehuda Adar, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 518, 536–38 
(Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014) (commenting on the judgment of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce). 
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knowledge test disputed in the doctrine.162 In Kingspan v. Borealis, a 
Danish seller and UK buyers disputed the lack of conformity of a polymer, 
Borecene, that the seller had delivered to the English buyers for use as a 
raw material to rotomould static tanks to hold bulk liquids.163 One of the 
issues was whether the buyers could avoid the effect of a lack of timely 
notice under CISG Article 39 because the Danish seller, according to CISG 
Article 40, “knew or could not have been unaware” of facts related to the 
lack of conformity which he did not disclose to the buyers.164 Justice 
Christopher Clarke elaborated on this knowledge test and concluded the 
following: 
It also applies where the lack of conformity relates to facts of which the seller 
could not have been unaware. That is, as it seems to me, an expression of a basis 
for deciding that the seller was in fact aware. If the facts are such that the seller 
could not have been unaware of them, then of them he must have been aware. 
That conclusion is consistent with the agreement between the experts contained 
in the joint memorandum that the seller will only have the relevant knowledge if 
“he knew or where his knowledge of the defect reasonably can be inferred, if not 
proven, from the circumstances in the particular case.” 
If I am wrong about that . . . then the test may be regarded as embracing wilful 
blindness to the obvious (insofar as that is different from actual knowledge) and 
knowledge of facts which would cause any reasonable person to be aware such 
that it would be grossly negligent not to realise what they signified.165 
The English court suggests that the expression could not have been 
unaware must be said to mean that a person was in fact aware and therefore 
knew, or, that his knowledge can reasonably be inferred, but not necessarily 
proven. The court’s reasoning thus supports the view in doctrine that the 
expressions “knew” and “could not be unaware” have basically the same 
meaning but differ with respect to the proof (evidence) of such 
“knowledge.” The court, however, did not state a firm opinion and made 
reference to what a reasonable person “would be grossly negligent not to 
realise”; and it did—to some extent—admit that there is room for doubt 
regarding this literal understanding of the language could not have been 
unaware. Because the court left room for interpretation, the precedence of 
                                                                                                                           
 
162 Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S, supra note 16, ¶ 1. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. ¶ 1021. 
165 Id. ¶¶ 1021–22 (emphasis in original). 
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the decision regarding the knowledge test is limited, since the court might 
have been convinced to follow the gross negligence interpretation if more 
support for this opinion in case law had been presented. The further 
available case law will be presented and discussed in detail in the following 
sections. 
D. Case Law on the CISG Article 40 Knowledge Test 
There is a long list of published cases on the interpretation of CISG 
Article 40 that proves the practical importance of the caveat venditor 
principle and of the seller’s disclosure of knowledge of the quality (or lack 
of quality) of the goods.166 A large part of this case law takes a stand on the 
CISG knowledge test. The focus below will be on selected decisions that 
address the knowledge test for the seller under CISG Article 40 and either 
expressly or indirectly touch upon the disputed interpretation of the 
wording “could not have been unaware.” 
1. Gross Negligence or Lightening the Burden of Proof of 
Knowledge—Initial German, Swiss, and Austrian Case Law 
In 1997 and 1998, four German courts and a Swiss court took the 
initial stand on the content of the knowledge test for the seller in CISG 
Article 40. However, the Austrian Supreme Court (“OGH”) in an early 
decision, also from 1998, referred only (but not without significance) to the 
negligence standard in CISG Article 40.167 The dispute over the knowledge 
standard was fortified in 1997 by the OLG Karlsruhe (“Protective foil 
case”)168 and OLG Munich (“Cashmere clothing case”),169 where two 
                                                                                                                           
 
166 For purposes of this analysis, I investigated, inter alia, the approximately 60 available cases 
addressing CISG Article 40 that are published on http://www.cisg-online.ch. 
167 Oberster Gerichtstof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 12, 1998, No. 2 Ob 328/97t (Austria), 
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/349.pdf [hereinafter Umbrella case] (“im 
Sinn des Art. 40 UNK schuldhaft gehandelt. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
168 Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe] June 25, 1997, No. 
1 U 280/96 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/263.htm [hereinafter 
Protective foil case]. 
169 Oberlandesericht München [Higher Regional Court of Munich] Mar. 11, 1998, No. 7 U 
4427/97 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/display.cfm?test=310 
[hereinafter Cashmere clothing case]. 
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distinct interpretations of the wording “could not have been unaware” were 
presented and still today divide the CISG doctrine into two different views. 
The OLG Karlsruhe saw the formulation as a lightening of the burden of 
proof of the difficult evidence of awareness, whereas the OLG Munich 
interpreted the wording as bad faith or the gross negligence unawareness of 
the seller. The OLG Karlsruhe stated: “Die Formulierung in Art. 40 CISG: 
‘über die er nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte’ stellt eine Beweiserleichterung 
für anders nur schwer zu beweisende Kenntnis dar.”170 To the contrary, the 
OLG Munich stated: 
Die Klägerin kann sich auf Art. 39 CISG berufen, da ihr kein Vorwurf der 
Bösgläubigkeit im Sinne von Art. 40 CISG zu machen ist. Eine grob fahrlässige 
Unkenntnis der Klägerin hat die Beklagte nicht dargetan. Diese läge nur vor, 
wenn die Klägerin, die die Ware ihrerseits herstellen läßt, augenfällige und 
gravierende Mängel ihrer Ware übersehen hat, die schon bei Anwendung 
einfachster Sorgfalt zu erkennen waren.171 
In 1998, the Swiss Commercial Court of Zürich reached the same solution 
as the OLG Münich in Cashmere clothing case and likewise expressly 
referred to a gross negligence test in CISG Article 40 that according to the 
court followed from the text of the CISG itself: 
Nach Art. 40 WKR [CISG] kann sich der Verkäufer nicht auf Art. 38 und 39 
WKR berufen, wenn die Vertragswidrigkeit auf Tatsachen beruht, die er kannte 
oder über die er nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte und die er dem Käufer nicht 
offenbart hat. Dabei genügt nach dem Gesetzestext bereits schon 
grobfahrlässige Unkenntnis.172 
In the same year, the OLG Koblenz, in its decision from September 11, 
1998 (Chemical substance case) did not continue the express reference to 
the gross negligence knowledge test in CISG Article 40 CISG but instead 
used the formulation that a certain understanding must not obtrude or 
impose (musste . . . nicht aufdrängen) itself upon the seller.173 The use of 
                                                                                                                           
 
170 Protective foil case, supra note 168 (emphasis added). 
171 Cashmere clothing case, supra note 169 (emphasis added). 
172 Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court of Zurich] Nov. 30, 1998, No. HG 93064/O, 
23 (Switz.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/415.pdf [hereinafter 
Lambskin coat case]. 
173 Oberlandesericht Koblenz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Koblenz] Sept. 11, 1998, No. 2 U 
580/96, ¶ I.2.c (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/505.htm 
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this formulation signals the need for clear and easily recognizable 
indication or facts of which the seller “could not be unaware” and, thus, 
seems to be identical to, or at least comes close to, the gross negligence 
standard.174 
2. Gross Negligence or More?—Stockholm, ICC and Russian Arbitral 
Awards 
Three arbitration awards have either dealt in detail with or taken an 
indirect stance on the knowledge test in CISG Article 40. Firstly, the 
arbitral award on CISG Article 40 rendered in 1998 by the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in Beijing Light 
Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Conell Ltd. Partnership deserves special attention as 
the decision elaborated in detail on the object and purpose of Article 40 and 
specifically addressed the knowledge test “could not have been 
unaware.”175 Moreover, the Stockholm award has in the doctrine been 
suggested to indicate a knowledge standard of more-than-gross negligence. 
The case involved a U.S. seller that had contracted to design, 
construct, and deliver to a Chinese buyer a large 4000-ton rail press 
designed to make frame rails that would be used by the buyer in the 
manufacture of light trucks in a factory outside Beijing that produced 
approximately 50,000 trucks per year.176 The parties communicated 
extensively for about one year before entering into the contract, which 
stipulated that the expensive rail press must be made “of the best materials 
with first class workmanship.”177 During the construction of the rail press at 
the seller’s Chicago plant, the Chinese buyer sent engineers to the plant, but 
the buyer’s workforce did not take part in the assembly and installation of 
the parts of the rail press, which malfunctioned after nearly three years of 
use.178 The seller built the rail press according to its own design, but during 
                                                                                                                           
 
[hereinafter Chemical substance case] (“Diese Vorstellung mußte sich der Beklagten auch nicht 
aufdrängen.”). 
174 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the interpretation of this language in CISG Article 35(3) by 
the OLG Koblenz in Electricity generator case). 
175 Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, supra note 161. 
176 Id. ¶ 4. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
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the construction process, the seller decided to replace an essential part (an 
A-5750 lock plate) with a different part (a P-52 lock plate) without 
notifying the buyer of the change or providing the buyer with any records 
or information regarding its installation.179 The only indication of the 
changed part was that the new locking device was stamped “P-52.”180 In the 
meantime, the buyer decided that after shipment and delivery of the rail 
press, the assembly and installation should be done by a third party under 
the agreed partial supervision of the U.S. seller.181 
The Arbitral Tribunal found that there was a lack of conformity, noting 
that the seller, in constructing the new, custom-made, large-size rail press 
had replaced “a planned design intended for an important security function 
with a new device without ascertaining its performance or installation.”182 
The decisive question then became whether the buyer, whose notification of 
lack of conformity did not take place until the press broke down, a time 
lapse of over three years from the time of delivery, could claim remedies—
that is, whether under CISG Article 40, the seller was precluded from 
claiming lack of timely notice under CISG Article 39 because it “knew or 
could not have been unaware of” the lack of conformity.183 The Tribunal 
first reasoned on the general requirement of “awareness” in Article 40 
CISG and, then, in the ratio decidendi went into a detailed discussion of its 
decision, as follows: 
The doctrine on the issue of the seller’s awareness according to Article 40 also 
reflects the difficulty in reaching a common denominator for the qualification of 
the necessary “awareness” . . . . As a clear case of the requisite awareness has 
been mentioned a situation where the non-conformity has already resulted in 
accidents in similar or identical goods sold by the seller and been made known 
to him or to the relevant branch of the industry. But also in the absence of such 
relatively clear cases awareness may be considered to be at hand if the facts 
relating to the non-conformity are easily apparent or detected. 
. . . . 
These are the circumstances that in the Tribunal’s opinion distinguishes this case 
from the situation where a seller is generally “aware” that the goods 
                                                                                                                           
 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. ¶ 6.3(b). 
183 Id. 
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manufactured in his ordinary course of business are not of the best quality or 
leave something to be desired. But that is not in itself enough to meet the test 
under Article 40. The requisite state of awareness that is the threshold criterion 
for the application of Article 40 must in the Tribunal’s opinion amount to at 
least a conscious disregard of facts that meet the eye and are of evident 
relevance to the non-conformity.184 
This reasoning in terms of “disregard of facts that meet the eye” does not 
seem to be any different from other descriptions of gross negligence in the 
sense of obvious facts relating to a non-conformity, which can be ignored 
only by gross negligence. The similarity of the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
reasoning with the formulation often-used by German courts in their 
decisions on the CISG “could not have been unaware” knowledge test in 
the sense of must obtrude or impose itself upon a party (musste sich 
aufdrängen) is striking. The difference is, that the Tribunal referred to the 
subjective element of “conscious,” which involves a lower degree of a 
subjective intent to disregard, similar to the statement of “willful blindness 
to the obvious” by the English High Court in the case Kingspan v. 
Borealis.185 In the end, the language of the majority of the Arbitral 
Tribunal—“conscious disregard of facts that meet the eye and are of 
evident relevance”—is not clear in this regard. It could, less convincingly, 
be interpreted as meaning either de facto knowledge with a lightened 
burden of proof, or more-than-grossly negligent.186 The Tribunal’s next 
statements can be understood as such,187 but this interpretation can be 
countered by the fact that a knowledge test based on gross negligence to 
some extent also lightens the burden of proof, that the CISG is not at all 
concerned with the procedural law and the law of evidence, and that the 
reasoning of the minority on the application in casu of the knowledge test 
formula adopted by the Tribunal “awareness or conscious disregard” 
referred to “a higher degree of subjective blameworthiness” but not de facto 
awareness or intent: 
                                                                                                                           
 
184 Id. (emphasis added). 
185 Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S, supra note 16. 
186 For this understanding see, inter alia, Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 649; perhaps more 
cautiously in the sense of “similar” (“ähnlich”) see Magnus, supra note 151, at 503. 
187 Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, supra note 161, ¶ 6.3(b) (stating that 
CISG Article 40 “as phrased is intended to alleviate the burden of proof on the buyer in respect of the 
seller’s awareness, a burden that otherwise often would be impossible”). 
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My reading of the requirement for the seller’s awareness is therefore more 
restrictive. The test of awareness or “conscious disregard” on the part of the 
seller requires in my opinion a higher degree of subjective blameworthiness than 
the one demonstrated by [seller] in this instance by their not supplying 
installation instructions for the P-52 lockplate.188 
When one considers the Tribunal’s introductory statements together 
with the final conclusive reasoning on the knowledge test in CISG Article 
40 by the majority of the arbitrators, it appears, firstly, that the Tribunal did 
not assume a de facto knowledge test with a relaxed burden of proof; 
secondly, that the arbitrators instead discussed the seller’s higher degree of 
negligence stemming from its awareness that proper installation of the 
substituted part was critical and that the buyer would be installing the part, 
and, therefore, of the possibility that the part would be installed incorrectly, 
with the inherent risk that incorrect installation would cause the failure of 
the rail press over time; and, thirdly, that the Tribunal stressed the fact that 
the U.S. seller “did not do anything.”189 In the view of the majority of 
arbitrators, the U.S. seller had acted negligently—in fact, grossly 
negligent—and had, moreover, not disclosed crucial information of which it 
could not have been unaware to the buyer. The minority view was also that 
the U.S. seller had acted highly negligent, but that the seller’s actions were 
not grossly negligent to the extent required by CISG Article 40—that is, in 
the sense of “a higher degree of subjective blameworthiness than the one 
demonstrated by [seller] in this instance by their not supplying installation 
instructions . . . .”190 From this, it should follow that both the majority and 
minority of the Tribunal were in agreement about a twofold knowledge test 
in CISG Article 40—a test of either awareness or “conscious disregard,” the 
latter in the sense of a high degree of negligence (gross negligence). 
                                                                                                                           
 
188 Id. ¶ 8 (Romlöv, dissenting) (emphasis added). 
189 Id. ¶ 6.3(b) (regarding CISG Article 40: “What is relevant is that [seller] cannot have been 
unaware of the fact that proper installation was critical, the fact that the possibility of improper 
installation by [buyer] could not be ruled out, the fact that there was a clear risk that this could lead to 
serious failure of the Press within a period of time that certainly differed from what [buyer] was entitled 
to expect under the Contract, and that [seller] did not do anything to eliminate this risk. The Tribunal 
therefore concludes that [seller] must be assumed to have consciously disregarded apparent facts which 
were of evident relevance to the non-conformity and which, in fact, caused the failure of the Press.”). 
190 Id. ¶ 8 (Romlöv, dissenting). 
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Secondly, the ICC Arbitration Court, in its 1999 award in Coke case, 
expressly addressed the knowledge standard in Article 40 CISG.191 In this 
case, the Arbitral Tribunal, by virtue of having a choice between the two 
opposite opinions in the German doctrine (one favouring a gross negligence 
standard for the knowledge test and the other favouring a “more than 
grossly negligent” standard), found for a knowledge test based on gross 
negligence.192 Even though the Tribunal makes several incorrect references 
to the Convention text, including references to CISG Article 8(1) and 
Article 40 as “knew or ought to have known,” the Tribunal’s stand on the 
issue is clear: 
As a consequence it has to be examined whether any of the above mentioned 
exceptions to Art. 39 CISG are applicable; i.e. if Defendant knew or ought to 
have known the non conformity of the coke when it was handed over to 
Claimant, after inspection and loading and failed to disclose this fact to Claimant 
(Art. 40 CISG) or whether Claimant had a reasonable excuse for not duly 
notifying Defendant (Art. 44 CISG). Art 40 CISG applies in case the seller was 
acting with intent or gross negligence.193 
Thirdly, the Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in its 2006 
decision, discussed not just knowledge but also negligence (presumably 
gross negligence) because the lack of conformity of the seller’s product 
could be clearly seen in certificates issued by the manufacturer.194 The 
seller, therefore, either knew or could not have been unaware of the fact 
that a breach of the quality requirements under the contract followed 
directly from the certificate issued by the manufacturer.195 
                                                                                                                           
 
191 Coke case, supra note 19. 
192 Id. ¶ 3. 
193 Id. (emphasis added). 
194 The Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Oct. 19, 2006, No. 53/2006, ¶ 3.5 (Russ. Fed’n), available at http://cisgw3.law 
.pace.edu/cases/061019r1.html. 
195 Id. 
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3. Breach of Obligation and a Higher Degree of Negligence—The U.S. 
BP Oil International v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador and In re 
Siskiyou Evergreen, Inc. Cases 
There are only few decisions from the United States on the 
interpretation of the knowledge test under the CISG that give guidance on 
the U.S. approach. The two available decisions concern firstly the ordinary 
negligent standard (culpa levis) and secondly the interpretation of the 
disputed formulation “knew or could not have been unaware,” where the 
latter is compared and distinguished from the knowledge test adopted in the 
UCC in terms of “has reason to know.” 
In the first, a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on 
June 11, 2003, in BP Oil International v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de 
Ecuador, the court rightly attributed to the buyer “ought to have known” 
knowledge of a third party to certify that the gum content in gasoline 
purchased from the seller was under the limit.196 In its reasoning, the Fifth 
Circuit cited CISG Article 40 as providing an obligation for the U.S. seller 
to not deliver goods that the seller knew or had constructive knowledge 
were non-conforming goods at the time that the risk passed to the buyer (in 
concreto “passed over the ship’s rail”).197 
Having appointed Saybolt to test the gasoline, [buyer] “ought to have 
discovered” the defect before the cargo left Texas. CISG art. 39(1). Permitting 
[buyer] now to distance itself from Saybolt’s test would negate the parties’ 
selection of CFR delivery and would undermine the key role that reliance plays 
in international sales agreements. Nevertheless, [seller] could have breached the 
agreement if it provided goods that it “knew or could not have been unaware” 
were defective when they “passed over the ship’s rail” and risk shifted to 
[buyer]. CISG art. 40.198 
On the contrary, the effect of CISG Article 40 is not an agreed or default 
obligation on the seller, which can be breached and lead to the seller’s 
liability for the buyer’s remedies, inter alia, the liability to pay the buyer 
damages. The legal effect consists of a seller’s duty, in his or her own 
                                                                                                                           
 
196 BP Oil Int’l Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003), 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030611u1.html. 
197 Id. at 338. 
198 Id. at 338 (emphasis added). 
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interest, to provide the buyer with information in good faith, and the direct 
legal consequence to the seller of not fulfilling this duty is the loss of its 
rights under the CISG—namely, the loss of the right to rely on the notice 
provisions to defend against the buyer’s claim of lack of conformity. 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon, in its 
2004 decision In re Siskiyou Evergreen, Inc., held that the CISG, according 
to CISG Article 1(1)(a), applied to a sale between a U.S. Christmas tree 
seller and a Mexican buyer and that conformity according to a contract 
specification had to be estimated based on a Christmas-tree grading system 
established by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), i.e., 
“delivery of plantation cut, USDA #1 or better trees.”199 Because the U.S. 
seller was fully aware of the USDA’s uniform-quality standards for 
Christmas trees, the court found that the seller “could not have been unware 
of” the fact that a significant number of the trees it had delivered did not 
meet those standards and that the constructive knowledge test of CISG 
Article 40 had therefore been satisfied: 
The Convention relieves the buyer of the duty to give notice if the seller “could 
not have been unaware” of the non-conformity. CISG Art. 40. Arguably, this 
language sets a lower standard of awareness than the phrase “his [has] reason 
to know” usually found in American law . . . . However, the Debtor is chargeable 
with an understanding of the uniform standards for Christmas trees established 
by the USDA, and could not have been unaware that the quality of nearly half 
the trees its own employees harvested and shipped failed to meet those 
standards.200 
By this reasoning, the court compared the standard of awareness according 
to the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and found that CISG 
Article 40 sets a lower standard (i.e., in the sense of a higher degree of 
negligence).201 Hence, the court did not regard the CISG knowledge test 
“could not have been unaware” as de facto knowledge but as a normative 
standard of what a party with some higher degree of negligence has reason 
                                                                                                                           
 
199 In re Siskiyou Evergreens, Inc., No. 02-66975-fra11, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1044, *6 (D. Or. 
Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040329u2.html. 
200 Id. at *17 (emphasis added). The phrase should be “has reason to know.” See U.C.C. § 1-202 
(“(a) Subject to subsection (f), a person has ‘notice’ of a fact if the person: (1) Has actual knowledge of 
it; (2) Has received a notice or notification of it; or (3) From all the facts and circumstances known to 
the person at the time in question, has reason to know that it exists. (b) ‘Knowledge’ means actual 
knowledge. ‘Knows’ has a corresponding meaning.”) (emphasis added). 
201 Id. 
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to know (constructive knowledge). This reasoning is similar to Julie 
George, where the Danish court engaged in considerations of whether 
“such a degree of negligence” was present to make CISG Article 35(3) 
applicable.202 
4. An Obiter Dictum of at Least Negligence Constituting a Breach of 
Customary Care in Trade—2009 Israeli Supreme Court in Pamesa 
Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 
On March 17, 2009, the Israeli Supreme Court in Pamesa Ceramica v. 
Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. issued an extensive obiter dictum in which it 
discussed the interpretation of the language aware or could not have been 
unaware of in ULIS Article 40 (identical to that in CISG Article 40) and the 
provision’s mental element of the seller.203 The Israeli Supreme Court went 
into an inquiry of what it saw as the main question: whether the formulation 
“could not have been unaware” means de facto awareness (or the 
equivalent) or a normative standard of negligence.204 
In its interpretation of the text of ULIS Article 40, the Israeli Supreme 
Court found support for its prima facie understanding of a de facto 
knowledge test in the views of the Israeli legislator and the language used 
in the Israeli domestic Sales Law Section 16 that is based on ULIS Article 
40—“knew or should have known”—which is more favourable to the 
seller.205 From the adoption of the different wording it, according to the 
Israeli Supreme Court, “appear[ed] that the Israeli legislature also thought 
that the language of the Hague Convention [ULIS] does not require 
negligence, and therefore it adopted a different language.”206 
As a result, in the opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court, the wording of 
ULIS Article 40 (CISG Article 40) prima facie points to de facto 
awareness.207 This understanding, however, does not seem convincing from 
either the wording itself or the legislative history of the ULIS and the CISG. 
The Israeli Supreme Court therefore consulted doctrine and case law and 
                                                                                                                           
 
202 Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder, supra note 90. 
203 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Eng’g Technical Supply Ltd., supra note 14, ¶ 36. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. ¶ 35. 
206 Id. ¶ 37. 
207 Id. 
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found that this narrow construction of the text (“the textual restrictions”) 
points to a prima facie de facto awareness test had not been followed by 
scholars and case law.208 After reviewing the entire range of views, in 
particular the reference to the verdict by the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. 
Conell Ltd. Partnership,209 the Israeli Supreme Court concluded in an 
obiter dictum that, for the purpose of deciding the case, a precise 
determination on the question of the mental element in the absence of actual 
awareness could be left open, and that “it is therefore sufficient to hold that 
even according to the opinions that give the broadest interpretation, art. 40 
requires at least negligence that constitutes a breach of the customary care 
in trade.”210 
E. Follow-up European Case Law—Almost Consensus about a Gross 
Negligence Test 
A decision by the Austrian OLG Graz in 2001211 and a Swiss decision 
from 2004212 expressly refer to the gross negligence test in CISG Article 40 
without discussing the dispute in doctrine or decisions in case law which 
might point to another interpretation. In 2004, the German Federal Supreme 
Court (BGH) and the German State Appeal Courts, OLG Celle and Hamm, 
likewise followed up on the earlier German OLG Munich 1998 decision213 
                                                                                                                           
 
208 Id. ¶ 38. 
209 Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, supra note 161. 
210 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Eng’g Technical Supply Ltd., supra note 14, ¶ 41 
(emphasis added). 
211 Oberlandesgericht Graz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Graz] Jan. 24, 2001, No. 4 R 
125/00k, 13 (Austria), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/800.pdf (“Die 
Bestimmungen sind für die Beurteiling dieser Rechtssache maßgeblich, zumal die Voraussetzungen des 
Artikel 40 UNKR [CISG]—Schlechtgläubigkeit oder grobe Fahrlässigkeit des Verkäufers—nicht 
behauptet wurden.”) (emphasis added). 
212 Kantonsgericht Schaffhausen [Cantonal Court of Schaffhausen] Jan. 27, 2004, No. 
11/1999/99, 13 (Switz.), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/960.pdf 
[hereinafter Model locomotives case] (“Gemäss WKR [CISG] verliert der Käufer . . . sein Recht, sich 
auf die Vertragswidrigkeit der Ware zu berufen, wenn er seinen Untersuchungs- und 
Rügeobliegenheiten nicht nachkommt—es sei den, der Verkäufer habe den Mangel, aus dem der Käufer 
seine Rechte herleiten will, gekannt oder grobfahrlässig nicht gekannt (“über die er nicht in Unkenntnis 
sein konnte”; Art. 38 und 39, sowie 40 WKR).”) (emphasis added). 
213 Cashmere clothing case, supra note 169. 
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and decided in favour of a knowledge test based on gross negligence.214 The 
Belgian Court of Appeal of Ghent, in its 2007 decision, also confirmed a 
gross negligence test in CISG Article 40 and, moreover, specified that the 
mere fact that goods are non-conforming is not in itself sufficient grounds 
to attribute to a seller de facto knowledge or grossly negligent unawareness 
of lack of conformity.215 Furthermore, the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) 
in 2012 referred to a content of a degree of negligence in CISG Article 
40,216 and subsequently in 2012 in Austrian Paprika case, directly referred 
to a gross negligence standard in its discussion of the burden of proof in 
CISG Article 40.217 Finally, the BGH in 2014, in an obiter dictum regarding 
the knowledge test in Article 40, referred to the expression “ins Auge 
springen müssen” (must jump into the eyes) without qualifying the 
expression and without any reference to doctrine.218 This formulation is 
                                                                                                                           
 
214 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] June 30, 2004, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3181, 
2004 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/847.pdf [hereinafter German 
paprika case] (“nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte . . . damit erfaßt Art. 40 CISG auch Fälle grob 
fahrlässiger Unkenntnis”); Oberlandesgericht Celle [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Celle] Mar. 10, 
2004, No. 7 U 147/03 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/824.pdf 
(“zumindest grob fahrlässig”); Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Hamm] 
Apr. 2, 2009, No. 28 U 107/08 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/ 
1978.pdf. 
215 Dat-Schaub International a/s v. Kipco Damaco N.V., Hof van Beroep, Gent [HvB] [Appeals 
Court of Gent Apr. 16, 2007, No. 2006/AR/477 (Belg.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/ 
content/api/cisg/urteile/1584.pdf (“Alhier wordt ofwel de kwade trouw in atte van de verkoper bedoeld, 
ofwel een grove nalatigheid in diens atte. Noch het een noch het ander wordt vermoed. De bewijslast is 
bij de koper. Uit de feitelijke elementen van de zaak volgt niet dat er sprake is van kwade trouw dan wel 
grove nalatigheid in hoofde van de geïntimeerde. De gebeurlijke aanwezigheid van veren in het vlees, is 
‘op zich’ onvoldoende om te besluiten dat de verkoper ervan hiervan kennis had of grovelijk nalatig zou 
zijn geweest.”) (emphasis added).  
216 Umbrella case, supra note 167. 
217 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 14, 2012, No. 10 Ob 4/12d (Austria), 
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/2308.pdf [hereinafter Austrian paprika 
case]. 
218 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 24, 2014, 202 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 258 (Ger.), available at http://www 
.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2545.pdf (“Hinsichtlich der Lieferung 40117 liege eine 
ordnungsgemäße Mängelrüge im Sinne des Art. 39 CISG vor. Im Übrigen könne dahinstehen, ob eine 
ordnungsgemäße Rüge erfolgt sei. Denn gemäß Art. 40 CISG sei auch eine nicht rechtzeitige oder nicht 
gehörige Mängelanzeige unschädlich, wenn der Verkäufer die Tatsachen, auf denen die 
Vertragswidrigkeit beruhe, gekannt habe oder darüber nicht in Unkenntnis habe sein können und diese 
dem Käufer nicht offenbart habe. So verhalte es sich im Streitfall. Der Klägerin hätten die vorhandenen 
Mängel “ins Auge springen” müssen, so dass sie hierüber nicht in Unkenntnis gewesen sein könne.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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used in part of the CISG doctrine to indicate more-than-gross negligence.219 
Whether the BGH thereby wished to depart from its earlier case law, which 
consolidated the German view on the knowledge test in terms of a gross 
negligence standard, is doubtful. The Swiss Supreme Court held in 2015 
that the formulation “could not be unaware of” (“nicht in Unkenntnis sein 
konnte”) in CISG Article 40 means situations, where the seller is unaware 
of an important and obvious lack of conformity which the seller by the 
exercise of superficial diligence would have known (“oberflächlicher 
Sorgfalt auffallen mussten”).220 
In European case law, a clear majority consensus has been reached 
about a gross negligence knowledge test in CISG Article 40. Nevertheless, 
a few cases have raised doubts about the interpretation of the knowledge 
test under the CISG and some seem to depart from this interpretation of a 
gross negligence standard. In Kingspan v. Borealis, the English High Court 
of Justice cautiously advocated for a de facto knowledge test in CISG 
Article 40, admitting, however, that there is room for doubt about whether 
it actually is a gross negligence standard.221 The German decision from 
OLG Zweibrücken in 2004,222 the French potato seedling cases from Cour 
d’appel de Rouen in 2006223 and Cour de Cassation in 2009,224 and, 
moreover, in the most recent cases decided in 2014 by the Spanish Tribunal 
Supremo in Red pepper powder case,225 and the French Cour de Cassation 
in Christmas tree case226 all depart from the standard gross negligence test. 
These five cases will be discussed in turn. 
                                                                                                                           
 
219 See Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 594–95. 
220 Bundesgericht [Bger.] Apr. 2, 2015, No. 4A 614/2014 (Switz.), available at http://www 
.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/display.cfm?test=2592 (emphasis added). 
221 Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S, supra note 16. 
222 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Zweibrücken] Feb. 2, 2004, 
No. 7 U 4/03 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/877.pdf [hereinafter 
Milling equipment case]. 
223 Cour d’appel de Rouen [CA] [Court of Appeal of Rouen] Dec. 19, 2006, No. 05/03275 (Fr.), 
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/1933.pdf [hereinafter Potato seedling 
case]. 
224 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court] Sept. 16, 2008, No. 07-11803; 07-12160 (Fr.), 
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/1851.pdf [hereinafter Potato seedling 
case appeal]. 
225 Red pepper powder case, supra note 16. 
226 Christmas tree case, supra note 16. 
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The first group of cases employs expressions indicating a high degree 
of negligence and raise the question whether a more-than-gross negligence 
standard is used. The 2004 decision by OLG Zweibrücken in Milling 
equipment case is important for the current dispute in the doctrine because 
the reasoning by the OLG Zweibrücken has been interpreted in German 
CISG doctrine as requiring an Article 40 knowledge test based on “more 
than gross negligence.”227 Similarly, the BGH in its 2014 obiter dictum 
used the same expression as the OLG Zweibrücken.228 Milling equipment 
case concerned a German seller’s delivery to an Iranian buyer of inferior 
goods of which the seller de facto knew regarding the main part of the 
delivery.229 Regarding the delivery of twelve mills that were of Russian 
origin instead of German, however, the court could not reason that the seller 
had knowledge that a substitution was not in accordance with the contract 
and, thus, non-conforming.230 Instead, the court, regarding the situation 
from the viewpoint of the seller, found that it was evident that there had not 
been a mistake in the delivery, that the seller had a right to resort to and 
deliver goods of another origin, and that there had not been any 
modification of the contract.231 Therefore, the court held that the conditions 
in CISG Article 40 were only fulfilled “wenn sich der Verkäufer sich über 
eine ins Auge springende Vertragswidrigkeit hinwegsetzt . . . .”232 This 
reasoning has—as indicated—in the German doctrine not convincingly 
been interpreted as requiring a knowledge test in CISG Article 40 based on 
more-than-gross negligence.233 This understanding of the reasoning is, 
however, not expressis verbis stated by the court, nor is there any 
                                                                                                                           
 
227 See Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 594–95; Magnus, supra note 151, at 503 (interpreting the 
decision as similar to such a test). 
228 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 24, 2014, 202 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 258 (Ger.), available at http://www 
.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2545.pdf. 
229 Milling equipment case, supra note 222. The German seller could not deliver the agreed 
quality products from a German manufacturer and, therefore, resorted to parts made by a Russian 
company and other “components” made by a Turkish company but did not disclose this to the buyer. Id. 
Moreover, some of these parts proved to have a lack of conformity. Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 16 (“when the seller ignores a lack of conformity which jumps into the eyes”) 
(translation by author). 
233 See Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 649; Magnus, supra note 151, at 503 (stating the decision 
as similar (“ähnlich”) to more than gross negligence). 
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comparison to a different lower gross negligence standard or a reference to 
a lighter burden of proof as advocated by one part of the doctrine. 
If one compares this wording of the reasoning by the OLG 
Zweibrücken with the previous verdict by the OLG Munich in Cashmere 
clothing case (“augenfällige und gravierende Mängel ihrer Ware übersehen 
hat, die schon bei Anwendung einfachster Sorgfalt zu erkennen waren 
. . . .”)234 and the OLG Koblenz in Electricity generator case (“musste sich 
. . . nicht aufdrängen”)235 and, moreover, with the reasoning of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award in Beijing Light 
Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. Partnership (“disregard of facts that 
meet the eye and are of evident relevance to the non-conformity”)236 and of 
the English High Court in Kingspan v. Borealis (“blindness to the 
obvious”)237 then the similarity is compelling. There does not seem to be 
any degree of difference between “ins Auge springende” (jumps into the 
eyes), “augenfällig” (obvious to the eye) and “musste sich . . . nicht 
aufdrängen” (must not obtrude or impose), German expressions which have 
been equated with gross negligence. These formulations all seem identical, 
or at least close, to a gross negligence standard. To conclude, it seems 
doubtful that there are convincing arguments or other elements of the OLG 
Zweibrücken decision that support an interpretation of the wording ins 
Auge springende (jumps into the eyes) as meaning “more-than-gross-
negligence.”238 The 2014 decision by the Spanish Tribunal Supremo in Red 
pepper powder case does not seem to fit into the existing body of case law 
as the court only referred to “negligence” without any indication of a higher 
degree thereof.239 However, the court reasoned that red chilli powder was 
sold in a market that should have generated distrust of the purity thereof, 
that the appearance of colourants was not unusual, and the case arose at a 
time when the presence of illegal colourants in chilli powder had produced 
a “food crisis” in Europe,240 a crisis which led to an intervention by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
234 Cashmere clothing case, supra note 169 (emphasis added). 
235 Electricity generator case, supra note 91 (emphasis added). 
236 Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, supra note 162 (emphasis added). 
237 Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S, supra note 16. 
238 For a different view, see Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 649. See also Magnus, supra note 151, 
at 503. 
239 Red pepper powder case, supra note 16. 
240 Id. 
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European Union to warn and prohibit the use of illegal colourants for 
human consumption in different countries and in the European Union.241 
Thus, these facts seem to bring the decision in line with the gross 
negligence standard in order to eliminate the possibility that the seller could 
invoke the consequences of default by the buyer to give timely notice 
according to CISG Article 39.242 
The next group of cases consists of decisions in which the courts’ 
reasoning mentioned only the elements of bad faith in Article 40, in the 
sense of referencing the seller’s knowledge of and non-disclosure of a lack 
of conformity without taking an express stance on the meaning of “could 
not have been unaware.”243 Although there are references in these cases to 
what the seller knew and whether there was a lack of conformity on the part 
of the seller, this does not imply that the decisions can be interpreted as 
requiring de facto knowledge coupled with non-disclosure in bad faith. 
Nevertheless, the wording and a literal understanding of the reasoning in 
the French decisions in the potato seedling cases of 2006244 and 2008245 
and, moreover, the Cour de Cassation in the French Christmas tree case246 
do quite strongly suggest that CISG Article 40 in these decisions was 
interpreted as requiring de facto knowledge and non-disclosure of this 
knowledge in the sense of mauvaise foi. 
In the French potato seedling cases a French buyer purchased from a 
Dutch seller (an agricultural cooperative) a large quantity of potato plants 
(twenty-five tons) grown from seed produced by a Dutch farmer.247 The 
French buyer planted some of these plants and subsequently harvested the 
potatoes.248 The Dutch farmer (the producer) had under public law an 
obligation to test its seeds as specified in Directive 77/93/EEC and these 
                                                                                                                           
 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Koblenz] June 3, 
2013, No. 2 U 50/12 (Ger.), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2469 
.pdf (“Dies könnte gemäß Art. 40 CISG zunächst bei Bösgläubigkeit des Verkäufers der Fall sein, wenn 
nämlich die Vertragswidrigkeit auf Tatsachen beruht, die der Verkäufer kannte oder über die er nicht in 
Unkenntnis sein konnte und die er dem Käufer nicht offenbart hat.”). 
244 Potato seedling case, supra note 223. 
245 Potato seedling case appeal, supra note 224. 
246 Christmas tree case, supra note 16. 
247 Potato seedling case, supra note 223. 
248 Id. 
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tests, de facto, had been conducted with a negative result.249 Nevertheless, it 
turned out that part of the crop of potatoes harvested and resold by the 
French buyer developed the bacterial disease ralstonia solanacearum 
(known as “brown rot”), that the area of the Dutch farmer’s land where the 
potato seeds and plants were produced was in fact contaminated with brown 
rot bacteria, and that, according to an expert, the only possible source of the 
contamination of the potatoes grown by the French buyer was the potato 
plants delivered by the Dutch seller.250 The French buyer and its sub-buyers 
filed a number of claims against the Dutch seller with the court of first 
instance in Rouen, two of which went on appeal to the Cour d’appel de 
Rouen in 2006 in Potato seedling case and Cour de Cassation in 2009 in 
Potato seedling case appeal. 
The Cour d’appel de Rouen in 2006 and Cour de Cassation in 2009 
both took a restrictive approach to CISG Article 40 and seem to have 
interpreted a bad faith requirement into the provision of Article 40, stricto 
sensu, and held that the seller must have had knowledge of the non-
conformity and concealed the non-conformity from the buyer.251 This 
becomes particularly clear in the reasoning of the courts: 
Attendu que l’article 40 de la Convention de VIENNE prévoit que le vendeur ne 
peut se prévaloir des dispositions des articles 38 et 39 . . . lorsque le défaut de 
conformité (ou le vice caché) porte sur des faits qu’il connaissait et qu’il n’a pas 
révélés à l’acheteur; Attendu qu’en l’espèce, dès lors que les plants litigieux 
bénéficiaient d’un certificat attestant de la négativité des tests, il ne peut être 
soutenu par [the buyer] que [the seller] lui aurait dissimulé un défaut de 
conformité qu’elle ignorait, . . . que le fait que les plants aient été élevés dans 
une zone atteinte par la pourriture brune ne peut par lui-même constituer la 
dissimulation visée par l’article 40 précité . . . .252 
[Q]ue l’article 40 de la Convention de Vienne sur la vente internationale de 
marchandises exclut que le vendeur puisse se prévaloir du défaut de 
dénonciation par l’acheteur du défaut de conformité, dans les deux ans, si le 
vendeur connaissait le risque de défaut et ne lelui a pas signalé; que dès lors en 
                                                                                                                           
 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id.; Potato seedling case appeal, supra note 224. See also Sylvaine Poillot-Peruzzetto, French 
Perspective of the CISG, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 338, 348 (Larry A. 
DiMatteo ed., 2014) (interpreting the Cour de Cassation decision as containing “no indication of bad 
faith on the part of the seller.”). 
252 Potato seedling case, supra note 223, at 22 (emphasis added). 
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l’espèce en ne recherchant pas si la société Agrico connaissait le risque de 
contamination de la production de M. S. . . . malgré un test négatif, la cour 
d’appel a privé sa décision de base légale au regard de l’article 40 de la 
Convention de Vienne.253 
These interpretations of CISG Article 40 requiring bad faith stricto sensu 
would indeed be directly contrary to the wording of the provision, the 
legislative history, the doctrine, and the vast majority of CISG case law. At 
best, the French decisions in the potato seedling cases and in other similar 
decisions should be understood, or narrowed down to an understanding, that 
the only CISG Article 40 issue discussed by the courts (i.e., the only issue 
pleaded by the parties) was the term “knew” and subsequent non-
disclosure, and that the courts did not mention the language “could not have 
been unaware of” and thus tacitly left its interpretation open. However, the 
Cour de Cassation has unfortunately in Christmas tree case between a 
Danish seller (Monsieur Y) and a French buyer (Monsieur X) maintained a 
bad faith requirement stricto sensu regarding CISG Article 40 with the 
following wording: 
[Q]ue l’article 40 de la convention de Vienne fait cependant échec aux deux 
dispositions précédentes lorsque le défaut de conformité porte sur des faits que 
le vendeur connaissait ou ne pouvait ignorer et qu’il n’a pas révélé à l’acheteur; 
que Monsieur X n’apporte aucun élément probant permettant d’affirmer que 
Monsieur Y connaissait les défauts de conformité et qu’il s’est abstenu de les lui 
révéler avant le 12 décembre 2005 . . . que dans ces conditions, aucune 
mauvaise foi du vendeur n’est démontrée, que l’article 40 de la convention ne 
permet donc pas de faire échec à l’exigence de délai raisonnable posée par 
l’article 39.254 
VI. CONCLUSION ON THE CISG KNOWLEDGE TEST—A THREE TEST 
STANDARD OF CULPA LEVIS, CULPA LATA AND DE FACTO KNOWLEDGE 
The foregoing thorough analysis of the content of the knowledge test 
under the CISG, including the wording, purpose, and intent (to the extent it 
is possible to deduce the purpose and intent from the long legislative history 
and statements in CISG doctrine) and a detailed interpretation of the CISG 
case law on the seller’s knowledge in CISG Article 35(3), compared with 
                                                                                                                           
 
253 Potato seedling case appeal, supra note 224, at 2 (emphasis added). 
254 Christmas tree case, supra note 16, at 4–5 (emphasis added). 
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the case law on the equivalent provision in CISG Article 40, leads to an 
understanding that the formulation “knew or could not have been unaware” 
means the de facto knowledge or grossly negligent unawareness of evident 
facts relating to a specific lack of conformity. Based on an analysis of the 
legislative history, comparative research, doctrine and case law, it can be 
concluded that there is prevailing support for a constructive knowledge test 
under the CISG based on two degrees of negligence: a degree of simple or 
ordinary negligence (culpa levis) and one of gross negligence (culpa lata). 
The dispute about the CISG knowledge test centres on the formulation 
“could not have been unaware.” There is no agreement in doctrine and case 
law.255 A minor part of the doctrine argues for an overall simple negligence 
test (culpa levis). A stronger view in the doctrine supports a “more than 
gross negligence” test (more than culpa lata) or de facto knowledge with a 
relaxed burden of proof concerning the formula “knew or could not have 
been unaware” (a form of willful blindness or conscious disregard in the 
sense of a lower degree of subjective intent comparable with dolus 
eventualis).256 Finally, some cases regarding this formula seem to require an 
act of bad faith in the sense of knowledge and non-disclosure (a form 
comparable with dolus directus or indirectus) under both CISG Articles 
35(3) and 40. These interpretations are nonetheless difficult to maintain in 
light of (1) the wording of the threefold knowledge test in the CISG, (2) the 
quite clear support in the legislative history for a gross negligent standard—
from Rabel’s drafts of the negotiations on the ULIS at the 1964 Diplomatic 
Conference in the Hague to the 1980 Vienna Conference on the CISG, 
(3) the prevailing view in doctrine supporting a higher degree of negligence 
than simple (ordinary) culpa—and (4) the view in the vast majority of case 
law for a gross negligence knowledge test under these CISG provisions. 
The analysis does also bring another important factor to light as it 
demonstrates the danger of using an undefined concept for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                           
 
255 See Austrian paprika case, supra note 217, at 12 (“Es besteht weitgehende Einigkeit darüber, 
dass die Formulierung “nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte” mit grob fahrlässiger Unkenntnis 
gleichzusetzen ist . . . .”). 
256 See Von Ulrich Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf Eines Übereinkommens Über Internationale 
Warenkaufverträg, in 43 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 413, 479, 482 (1979) for a more-than-gross-negligence test (“[D]as ist mehr als ‘grob 
Fahrlässigkeit’ im Sinn unseres . . . .”). See also Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 594–95. For a de facto 
knowledge test with a relaxed burden of proof see Lookofsky, supra note 47. 
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the harmonization and unification of commercial law. Despite the fact that 
the doctrine on the CISG is divided into three major positions: (1) a gross 
negligence test, (2) a more-than-gross-negligence test, and (3) a de facto 
knowledge test with a relaxed burden of proof, the convincing 
interpretation of the knowledge test under the CISG is that the term could 
not have been unaware refers to a higher degree of negligence—a gross 
negligence standard. 
From an analytical point of view, it is possible to put forward several 
arguments to support the view that this knowledge test is based on simple 
and grossly negligent unawareness standards. But, it is also possible to 
make a few counter-arguments against the gross negligent standard, which 
must be mitigated as much as possible. The most important pros and cons 
are the following. 
A. Pros of a Gross Negligence Standard 
Firstly and foremost, this threefold distinction does express the well-
balanced CISG sales law regime by supporting the underlying caveat 
venditor principle of the CISG, which confers on the seller a default 
obligation to deliver conforming goods fit for ordinary use, and expresses a 
buyer-friendly limited caveat emptor rule based on the absence of a buyer’s 
duty to make a pre-contractual inspection of the goods but still strictly 
requiring the buyer’s inspection after delivery and notice of lack of 
conformity. The buyer-friendly caveat emptor provision in CISG Article 
35(3) underlining the caveat venditor principle of the CISG conformity 
rules must, under the design of the CISG regime, be counterbalanced with 
the seller-friendly provision of CISG Article 40, under which the seller only 
in exceptional cases is excluded from relying on the legal certainty 
established by the strict notice requirements for lack of conformity. 
Moreover, the gross negligence standard supports the important CISG 
contract formation principle of “meeting of the minds,” which requires that 
the subjective intention of one party must be clearly shared by the other 
contracting party in terms that the other party is aware of what the intention 
is or by minimal (less) diligence would have been aware. Only if the other 
party was grossly negligent (ignorant) of what the intention of the other 
party was, he or she will be bound thereby. This ensures clarity and 
certainty regarding contract formation. 
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Secondly, a gross negligence standard does not involve any deviation 
from the wording of the CISG. On the contrary, there is a construction, 
which is supported by an intended distinction between “knowledge” and 
“constructive knowledge,” based on three different knowledge tests as 
underlying principles on which the Convention is based. In the CISG 
provisions, these three tests are most often expressed as “knew,” “could not 
have been unaware of,” and “ought to have known.” There is no support in 
the wording for the interpretation that the formulation “knew or could not 
have been unaware” refers only to de facto knowledge. Moreover, nothing 
in the wording indicates that the question of the level of the burden of 
proof, or any other question of the law of evidence, is regulated by the 
Convention. On the contrary, the procedural law of evidence, including an 
estimation of whether a burden of proof placed on a particular party by 
substantive rules in the CISG has been demonstrated sufficiently, is not 
governed by the CISG and is thus left to the procedural law of the lex fori. 
Thirdly, on this single CISG issue, the legislative history and the 
travaux préparatoires of both the 1964 Diplomatic Conference on the ULIS 
and of the CISG are, with rare exception, quite consistent and 
unambiguous. The travaux préparatoires provide evidence that the object 
and purpose was to describe a standard for the knowledge test that is more 
than simple negligence (culpa levis) but less than de facto knowledge—a 
concept of gross negligence well-known since Roman times in many 
national legal systems and unknown in few jurisdictions. The gross 
negligence standard (culpa lata) was confirmed by the choice of the 
wording could not have been unaware or ne pouvait ignorer (could not 
ignore), which was thought to be different from the normal phrases of 
simple (ordinary) negligence (culpa levis). The travaux préparatoires of 
CISG Article 35(3) and 8(1) are particularly significant in that proposals 
(made both before and during the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference) to 
require either de facto knowledge or simple negligence were not adopted.257 
The formulation could not have been unaware of was maintained as a 
middle approach between the two—a certain higher degree of negligence. 
Fourthly, the meaning of “more than gross negligence” seems difficult 
to grasp and to define. Making a clear distinction between simple and gross 
                                                                                                                           
 
257 See supra Part III. 
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negligence and “more than gross negligence” is difficult to do in practice 
and is, equally, a theoretical challenge. Such a new fourfold distinction 
would not make global sales law any simpler and would be a novelty, as it 
was not addressed in the making of the ULIS or the CISG. 
Finally, an interpretation in favour of a de facto knowledge test with a 
relaxed burden of proof would force the CISG to enter into alien territory of 
the law of evidence in the lex fori and in domestic procedural law, which 
could lead to a non-uniform interpretation and application, and, in addition, 
overstep the borderline between issues governed and harmonized by the 
CISG and issues not governed by the CISG and left to domestic law. 
B. Cons of a Gross Negligence Standard and Their Mitigation 
There are only few cons concerning the use of the concept of gross 
negligence, but they are important, two of which are mentioned below, 
together with remarks on how these drawbacks can be mitigated. First, the 
CISG text does not include a definition of the knowledge test, nor did the 
CISG adopt a revised ULIS Article 13 that addressed the issue. This makes 
interpreting the CISG knowledge test difficult, and the uncertainties must 
be resolved through uniform interpretation and the development of the 
underlying CISG principles. 
Second, it may be difficult to formulate and translate a gross 
negligence concept, a standard which—although known since Roman 
law—may be unknown to a number of domestic legal systems, where the 
civil law is based on the concepts of de facto knowledge, i.e., “knew,” or of 
simple negligence in the sense of “ought to have known” and similar 
formulations or where in civil law different concepts and expressions are 
used to indicate a higher degree of negligence. 
Regarding the harmonization the CISG has achieved, these two 
counterarguments may mean that it will be difficult to develop a uniform 
global understanding and definition of gross negligence (culpa lata). That 
this is a challenge can be seen in the various formulations and terms that 
have been used in the case law for CISG Articles 35(3) and 40 to describe 
the mental requirement of the concept. From this, it follows that guidelines 
on the meaning and a definition of the gross negligence standard are 
needed. 
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C. Guidance on and Definition of a Gross Negligence Standard 
On the assumption that the term could not have been unaware in CISG 
Articles 8(1), 35(3), 40, and 42(2) expresses a grossly negligent 
unawareness standard (culpa lata), the content of this standard must be 
defined, or at least described, using guidelines that are as clear as possible. 
Both the preamble of the CISG and Article 7(1) stipulate that in interpreting 
the text “regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity.” From this, the doctrine and case law have 
convincingly deduced a demand for a uniform and autonomous 
interpretation which is, in principle, independent from domestic law. 
The demand for an autonomous interpretation does, however, have a 
limitation. If it can be established that a legal concept in the CISG was 
intentionally adopted by the CISG drafters and that it, thus, derives from 
one or more domestic legal systems, then, in the understanding and 
interpretation of specific provisions of the CISG, it is permissible to take 
such concepts, as understood in those particular domestic laws, into 
account.258 With the evident and clear legislative history, as outlined in 
Rabel’s comparative work (referring to German and Swiss law and partly to 
Scandinavian law regarding the gross negligence test in the caveat emptor 
rule),259 and with the earlier drafts of the negotiations in the Hague, which, 
after the intervention of the German delegation, led to the adoption of the 
gross negligence standard in ULIS Article 36 (a result that remains 
unchanged in the CISG), there is sufficient justification—if justification is 
needed—to seek some guidance in German domestic sales law and Nordic 
domestic sales law.260 Here, the gross negligence standard is used in civil 
law in, inter alia, German law sales law (§ 442 BGB), property law (§ 932 
BGB), and insurance law,261 and Danish law (inter alia SGA, købeloven, 
which, however, provides for a qualified gross negligence standard in § 53 
                                                                                                                           
 
258 See Magnus, supra note 151, at 191. 
259 RABEL, supra note 48, at 173. 
260 See Magnus, supra note 151, at 191. See also Stumpf, supra note 59, at 280 (discussing the 
interpretation of ULIS Article 36). 
261 See Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] Nov. 23, 2007, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz 
[VVG], as amended, § 28(2) (Ger.) (“[G]rob fahrlässigen Verletzung der Obliegenheit . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
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SGA).262 First and foremost, case law on the CISG should be consulted in 
order to develop the necessary guidelines on the meaning and definition of 
the gross negligence standard as an underlying principle of the CISG. 
1. Object and Purpose of a Higher Degree of Negligence 
It follows from the object and purpose of the use of the language could 
not have been unaware in CISG Articles 8(1), 35(3), 40, and 42(2) (in the 
sense of a gross negligence standard) that the aim is to set a higher bar for 
the constructive knowledge of a party in order to (1) ascertain that the 
parties actually share a common intent (under CISG Article 8(1), one 
party’s subjective intent which with a high likelihood is shared by the other 
party), (2) provide for a buyer-friendly provision (under the caveat emptor 
rules of CISG Articles 35(3) and 42) that does not impose on the buyer a 
duty to make a pre-contractual inspection of the goods,263 or (3) establish a 
seller-friendly provision by limiting the situations in which a seller may be 
precluded from relying on the important certainty of the requirements for 
timely notice of lack of conformity. 
2. The Lower and Upper Threshold for Gross Negligence 
The spectrum of a constructive knowledge test based on gross 
negligence can be defined as follows: on one end of the spectrum is the 
lower threshold in which a party (a bonus pater familia reasonable person) 
not only has or ought to have had knowledge of, inter alia, the specific lack 
of conformity but also, because of evident, obvious, and striking facts, 
simply must have seen, could not ignore, or could not be unaware thereof 
by the conduct of less diligence.264 It is not a degree of diligence, which a 
                                                                                                                           
 
262 See Danish legislation, supra note 6. 
263 See RABEL, supra note 48, at 173 (“[N]ur grobfahrlässige Unkenntnis wird dieser Kenntnis 
gleichgestellt. Hier braucht der Käufer nicht vor Kaufabschluß zu untersuchen.”). 
264 In re Siskiyou Evergreens, Inc., No. 02-66975-fra11, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1044, *17 (D. Or. 
Mar. 29, 2004) (“[S]ets a lower standard of awareness than the phrase ‘[has] reason to know’. . . .”). 
See also Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117, 118 (C.C.D. R.I. 1822) (No. 14,130) (distinguishing between 
simple and gross negligence); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 11, 1953, No. 
IV ZR 170/52 (Ger.), available at https://www.jurion.de/Urteile/BGH/1953-05-11/IV-ZR-170_52 
(regarding § 932 BGB and emphasizing that the assessment of gross negligence depends on the concrete 
circumstances and whether the violation of normal care seems particularly coarse and gross: “ob nach 
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very prudent or prudent business man usually takes but a lack of the care, 
which business men of common sense, however inattentive, usually take, or 
ought to be presumed to take, for that is—in the words of Justice Story—
gross negligence.265 
On the other end of the spectrum is in practice the upper threshold, the 
point at which de facto knowledge of the specific lack of conformity has 
not been proven as required by the applicable domestic procedural law on 
evidence or admitted, but where the absence of knowledge is so unlikely 
that this is due to an intentional conduct not to show diligence at all. Such 
presumed intentional ignorance can in practice be seen as an upper 
threshold of a gross negligent standard, which in case law has been 
described as “conscious disregard”266 or “willful blindness to the 
obvious”267 and referred to as more-than-gross negligence in doctrine. This 
presumed intentional ignorance or even de facto knowledge and non-
disclosure (bad faith) is, however, not a requirement for gross negligence. 
3. Content and Expressions of Gross Negligence 
A grossly negligent unawareness of a specific lack of conformity of 
goods can arguably be said to be present when a party, even in the presence 
of evident, obvious, and striking facts relating to the lack of conformity, has 
not seen or become aware of the non-conformity.268 Multiple suitable 
                                                                                                                           
 
der Gesamtlage der Umstände die Sorgfaltverletzung als besondere schwer erscheint . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
265 Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117 (C.C.D. R.I. 1822) (No. 14,130) (Story, C.J.). 
266 See Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, supra note 161. 
267 See Kingspan Envtl. Ltd. v. Borealis A/S, supra note 16. 
268 See the definition of the domestic concept of gross negligence developed in German case law 
and the leading decision of the BGH from May 11, 1953, supra note 264, in a case concerning an 
acquisition in good faith (gutgläubiger Erwerb in § 932 BGB): “Der Begriff der groben Fahrlässigkeit 
als solcher ist . . . ein Rechtbegriff . . . Was grobe Fahrlässigkeit ist, sagt das Gesetz nicht. Die 
Rechtsprechung versteht darunter im allgemeinen ein Handeln, bei dem die erforderliche Sorgfalt nach 
den gesamten Umständen in ungewöhnlichen groβen Maβe verletzt worden ist und bei dem dasjenige 
unbeachtet geblieben ist, was im gegebenen Falle jedem hätte einleuchten müssen . . . .” (emphasis 
added). See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 29, 2003, No. IV ZR 173/01 
(Ger.), available at http://openjur.de/u/66087.html (following the rationale from the BGH 1952 
decision); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 11, 2007, No. XII ZR 197/05 
(Ger.), available at http://openjur.de/u/77120.html (same). The BGH has in its case law since 1966, 
moreover, found that the concept of gross negligence in German civil law in order to achieve legal 
certainty is in principle a uniform concept. See [BGH], No. IV ZR 173/01 (“Nach ständiger 
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wordings to express such blatant facts are possible and are often 
employed—as evidenced in the CISG case law. Some continental European 
courts that are familiar with the concept of gross negligence in their 
domestic law tend, however, to expressly refer to this standard.269 In other 
courts’ decisions, alternative formulations are used, presumably because the 
text of the Convention itself does not expressis verbis refer to gross 
negligence or define the concept.270 A few decisions refer to the gross 
negligence standard first and thereafter also make use of more illustrative 
alternative language such as “must fall into the eye.”271 
What all these alternative formulations have in common is that they do 
not refer to the normal simple (ordinary) negligence standard (in the sense 
of what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would or ought to 
have known) but, instead, add to this test and indicate a higher degree of 
negligence by requiring more than simple negligence (culpa levis)—which 
in the Roman law is referred to as culpa lata, in common law as “gross 
negligence” and in German/Nordic law as “grobe Fahrlässigkeit” and 
“grov uagtsomhed.” To read these alternative illustrative formulations as 
indicating a different degree of negligence than gross negligence (in the 
sense of “more than gross negligence”) or a de facto knowledge test under 
the CISG is not convincing. On the contrary, the formulations ins Auge 
                                                                                                                           
 
Rechtsprechung der Zivilsenate des [BGH] wird der Rechtsbegriff der groben Fahrlässigkeit 
grundsätzlich einheitlich bestimmt . . . . An diesem Grundsatz ist schon aus Gründen der 
Rechtssicherheit festzuhalten.”); see also [BGH], No. XII ZR 197/05. 
269 See, e.g., Used Mercedes Benz case, supra note 86, ¶ 2 (“[G]rob fahrlässig unwissende . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); Clay case OLG, supra note 114. 
270 For formulations regarding CISG Article 35(3) see Electricity generator case, supra note 91, 
at 4 (“musste . . . nicht aufdrängen”); Julie George v. Kristian Skovridder, supra note 90 (“[S]uch a 
degree of negligence . . . .”) (emphasis added); RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transp. Sales Ltd., supra note 88 
(“[F]or them (and anyone else) to see . . . .”) (emphasis added). For formulations regarding CISG 
Article 40 see Cashmere clothing case, supra note 169 (“[A]ugenfällige und gravierende Mängel ihrer 
Ware übersehen hat, die schon bei Anwendung einfachster Sorgfalt zu erkennen waren . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Koblenz] Sept. 11, 1998, No. 2 U 
580/96 (Ger.) (“Diese Vorstellung mußte sich der Beklagten auch nicht aufdrängen.”) (emphasis added); 
Beijing Light Automobile Co. Ltd. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, supra note 161 (“[A] conscious disregard of 
facts that meet the eyes . . . .”) (emphasis added); Milling equipment case, supra note 222 (“[I]ns Auge 
springende Vertragswidrigkeit hinwegsetzt.’”) (emphasis added). 
271 See Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Hamm] Apr. 2, 2009, No. 28 
U 107/08 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/1978.pdf (“Dass dem 
Beklagten diese Mängel nicht unbekannt geblieben sein konnten, was zumindest grobe Fahrlässigkeit 
verlangt . . . lässt sich auch nicht feststellen. Der Kläger behauptet nicht, dass es sich um Mängel 
handelt, die bei einer bloßen Sichtprüfung hätten ins Auge fallen müssen.” (emphasis added). 
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springende or le défaut saute aux yeux (jumps into the eye);272 ins Auge 
fallen (falls into the eye); augenfällig (obvious to the eye); for them (and 
anyone else) to see; facts that meet the eye, or other imaginable 
formulations are quite similar.273 
The spectrum of expressions is manifold and will continue to develop 
as such in the future. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the 
undefined wording “could not be unaware of” in the CISG is expressly 
referred to as an autonomous uniform “gross negligence” concept. 
4. The Objective Basis of the Gross Negligence Test 
The final question to be considered is whether the basis of the gross 
negligence test is an objective or a subjective standard. The doctrine on the 
CISG addresses the issue only rarely.274 The German commentary on the 
ULIS took a stand in the comments on ULIS Article 36 and argued, in line 
with German domestic law, that gross negligence could not be a purely 
objective standard.275 During the 1980 Diplomatic Conference on the CISG, 
Canada’s proposed rewording of Article 33 was partly based on the concern 
that the knowledge test in the caveat emptor rule knew or could not be 
unaware appeared to be subjective and on the belief that the test should be 
objective.276 In the author’s opinion, there are convincing arguments to 
                                                                                                                           
 
272 KARL HEINZ NEUMAYER ET AL., CONVENTION DE VIENNE SUR LES CONTRATS DE VENTE 
INTERNATIONALE DE MA RCHANDISES: COMMENTAIRE 285 (1993). 
273 See generally Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 11, 1952, No. IV ZR 
170/52 (Ger.) (describing gross negligence as “jedem hätte einleuchten müssen”); Østre Landsretsdom 
[ØLD] [Danish Eastern Court of Appeal] Dec. 16, 1949, UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN [UfR] 1941.416, 
419 [Den.] (regarding § 53 of the Sale of Goods Act: “conspicuous even by a superficial inspection”—
“iøjnefaldende selv ved en flygtig Besigtigelse”); Højesteret [Danish Supreme Court] Jan. 11, 1961, 
UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN [UfR] 1961.160, 164 (Den.) (regarding § 5 of the Real Estate Registration 
Act: “must have been clear . . . with all likelihood—“måtte det have stået . . . klart, . . . efter al 
sandsynlighed . . . .”); Vestre Landsretsdom [VLD] [Danish Western Court of Appeal] Sept. 19, 2001, 
UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN [UfR] 2001.2552, 2555 (Den.) (“[C]learly must realize”—“klart måtte 
indse”). 
274 See Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 595. 
275 See Stumpf, supra note 59, at 280 (referencing German domestic law and § 277 BGB [German 
Civil Code] “Im Gegensatz zur gewöhnlichen Fahrlässigkeit (Art. 13) ist der Maβstab bei der 
Bestimmung der groben Fahrlässigkeit kein rein objektiver.”) (emphasis in original). 
276 Official Record, supra note 68, at 308 (“The ascribed knowledge of defects should be based on 
an objective standard, not a subjective one. The Canadian amendment would have introduced that 
element of objectivity.”). See also HONNOLD, supra note 65, at 398. 
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support the view that both simple and gross negligence under the CISG are 
objective knowledge tests. 
Firstly, the assessment and standards of the CISG are generally 
regarded as objective standards,277 which support a uniform and 
autonomous interpretation of the convention and leads to a more predictable 
and certain application of the CISG. Secondly, subjective standards are 
difficult to administer in practice and thus create uncertainty. The argument 
put forward in favour of a partly subjective test is that the expertise of a 
party needs to be taken into account.278 This argument is convincing to the 
extent that the seller or buyer may be such an expert on the goods such that 
he or she can readily determine if the goods delivered or received are 
defective or substandard, or an intermediate trader rapidly reselling or 
buying the goods on the market with less or no detailed knowledge of the 
quality or professional expertise to assess the quality of the goods. 
However, the objective knowledge test specifically evaluates the 
knowledge of a reasonable businessman in the same position and with the 
same professional skills. Thus, there are no convincing reasons to deviate 
from the usual objective standards under the CISG—although such a 
deviation is supported by some domestic laws.279 This would force the 
courts applying the CISG to investigate a party’s mind, subjective 
weakness, and mental state and does not seem recommendable in a 
commercial CISG setting. Just as the simple negligence test is based on the 
behaviour of a reasonable man in the same situation (a bonus pater familias 
figure), the gross negligence test is equally capable of being based on an 
                                                                                                                           
 
277 See Magnus, supra note 151, at 210 (“Die objektive Sichtweise, . . . , ist darüber hinaus 
durchgehend für die gesamte Konvention zugrunde zu legen . . . .”) (emphasis in original); id. at 333 
(“Interessenbewertung auf objektiver Grundlage”) (emphasis in original); id. at 854. 
278 Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 595. 
279 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 11, 1953, No. IV ZR 170/52 (Ger.) 
(“[H]ierbei sind auch subjektive in der Individualität des Handelnden begründete Umstände zu 
berücksichtigen . . . .”). See also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 8, 1992, No. 
IV ZR 223/91 (Ger.), available at https://www.jurion.de/Urteile/BGH/1992-07-08/IV-ZR-223_91; 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 29, 2003, No. IV ZR 173/01 (Ger.), available 
at https://openjur.de/u/66087.html; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 7, 2007, 
No. XII ZR 197/05 (Ger.), available at https://openjur.de/u/77120.html (regarding a case about agreed 
standard terms in a rent contract: “auch in subjektiver Hinsicht unentschuldbares Fehlverhalten handeln 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). This definition of gross negligence in German domestic law has apparently 
influenced the view under both the ULIS and the CISG by German scholars. See Stumpf, supra note 59, 
at 280 (discussing identical language); Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 595. 
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objective reasonable man test.280 To promote legal certainty under the CISG 
regime, all businessmen should be treated alike according to an objective 
commercial standard. Moreover, an objective interpretation of the gross 
negligence standard under the CISG regime is in accordance with the no-
fault principle (CISG Article 45(1)(b) and Article 61(1)(b)), strict liability 
(CISG Article 79), and objective reasonable person interpretation (CISG 
Article 8(2)). 
VII. PRE-CONTRACTUAL EXAMINATION 
A. No Duty of the Buyer to Make Pre-contractual Examination under the 
CISG 
The knowledge test of de facto knowledge or grossly negligent 
unawareness in the caveat emptor rule in CISG Articles 35(3) and 42(2) 
leads to a clear conclusion that the CISG does not impose a duty on the 
buyer to make a pre-contractual examination of the goods being traded.281 
This understanding had been supported by Rabel282 and was the prevailing 
view under the ULIS.283 The doctrine under the CISG almost concurs in this 
view and case law seems to go along with it as well.284 According to the 
caveat emptor, the buyer, therefore, has no duty to conduct the detailed 
examination required in CISG Article 38 before the conclusion of the 
contract, and neither does the seller, under CISG Article 40, have a duty to 
make an Article 38 examination of the goods before the (re)sale.285 
                                                                                                                           
 
280 See also BGH, No. IV ZR 223/91 (concerning insurance in a traffic accident and grossly 
negligent behavior of the policy holder under the German Insurance Contract Act, where the BGH 
defines gross negligence as both an objective and subjective test (“objektiv grob fahrläsig gehandelt . . .” 
and “die subjekitven Voraussetzungen für die Wertung dieses Verhaltens als grob fahrlässig . . . .”)). 
Thus, under German law, gross negligence requires an objective and subjective assessment, and this 
results in a higher overall standard for the gross negligence test. 
281 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & CLAUDE WITZ, CONVENTION DE VIENNE SUR LES CONTRATS DE 
VENTE INTERNATIONALES DE MARCHANDISES n.210 (2008). 
282 RABEL, supra note 48, at 173 (“[N]ur grobfahrlässige Unkenntnis wird dieser Kenntnis 
gleichgestellt. Hier braucht der Käufer nicht vor Kaufabschluß zu untersuchen.”). 
283 See Stumpf, supra note 59, at 280. 
284 See Magnus, supra note 151, at 430–31. 
285 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Hamm] Apr. 2, 2009, 
No. 28 U 107/08 (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/1978.pdf (“Ein 
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Therefore, even when the seller invites the buyer to inspect and examine the 
goods before contract conclusion, the buyer’s failure to conduct a pre-
contractual inspection is not considered gross negligence.286 The crucial 
question, then, concerns the importance of a de facto pre-contractual 
examination by the buyer in the light of the gross negligence test. 
B. Importance of a De Facto Examination by the Buyer 
Another consequence of the knowledge test based on de facto 
knowledge or grossly negligent unawareness is that it relaxes the 
requirement that the buyer (or the seller under Article 40 CISG) conduct an 
examination.287 Therefore, under the CISG caveat emptor rule, if a pre-
contractual inspection is done, a buyer only loses the right to claim a lack of 
conformity if a superficial examination would have revealed evident, 
obvious, and striking facts relating to the lack of conformity. If the parties 
have agreed on a certain requirement for conformity, the caveat emptor rule 
in CISG Article 35(3) does not require the buyer performing a de facto 
examination to search for and test to see whether the requirements are 
actually fulfilled.288 Similarly, if the seller invites the buyer to do an 
inspection in order to show the buyer the obvious actual state of the goods, 
in particular of old or second-hand goods, and if the buyer declines the 
opportunity to conduct a superficial examination, the buyer’s behaviour 
may, in the concrete circumstance, be held to be gross negligence. It goes 
without saying, however, that the CISG seller cannot escape liability and 
the caveat venditor principle in CISG Article 35(2) simply by making 
invitations for buyers to inspect the goods sold. 
                                                                                                                           
 
Autohändler, der ein Fahrzeug zum Verkauf anbietet, ist grundsätzlich nur gehalten, es im Hinblick auf 
Mängel einer Sichtprüfung zu unterziehen . . . .”). 
286 Under the ULIS this interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history as a proposal from 
Denmark under the negotiations to amend ULIS Article 36 in line with the domestic Danish (and the old 
Nordic SGA) caveat emptor rule (today Danish SGA § 47) so that the seller would not be liable for a 
lack of conformity if the seller invited the buyer to examine or the buyer had been given the opportunity 
to inspect the goods but subsequently did not do so. See Riese, supra note 60, at 48–49. See also 
Stumpf, supra note 59, at 280 (denying a pre-contractual duty to inspect under the ULIS). 
287 OLG Hamm, No. 28 U 107/08 (“Dass sich der Beklagte auf die Angaben seiner ihm als 
zuverlässig bekannten Lieferantin verließ und das Fahrzeug selbst nur auf sichtbare Mängel 
untersuchte, ist ihm nicht als grobes Verschulden vorzuwerfen.”) (emphasis added). 
288 See Electricity generator case, supra note 91, at 4. 
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In conclusion, it does very much depend on the concrete 
circumstances, but the starting point is that the CISG seller under caveat 
venditor is obliged to deliver goods fit for ordinary use, that the CISG 
buyer under caveat emptor is not obligated to conduct a pre-contractual 
inspection, even if it receives an invitation or has an opportunity to do so, 
and that the buyer who conducts a de facto pre-contractual inspection need 
only make a superficial inspection to find evident, obvious, and striking 
facts relating to the lack of conformity. 
VIII. THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DE FACTO OR 
CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
The final issue to be addressed in this analysis of the knowledge test 
under the CISG is the practical importance of the placement of the burden 
of proof. As a starting point, most domestic procedural laws follow the 
principle actori incumbit probatio (on the plaintiff rests the proving; i.e., 
the burden of proof) or onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non qui negat 
(the burden of the proof lies upon him who affirms, not he who denies). 
Following this general principle, each party bears the burden of proof for 
the factual circumstances which, according to the relevant provision in the 
CISG, become the basis of a claim or defense. The prevailing and 
convincing view sees a substantive regulation of the placement of the 
burden of proof in many CISG provisions and, thus, in many situations, 
regards the burden of proof question as being governed by the 
Convention.289 
There are good arguments to support the position that the CISG 
provides only partial regulation of the allocation of the burden of proof. 
Firstly, the allocation of the burden of proof is increasingly regarded as an 
                                                                                                                           
 
289 For the prevailing view in doctrine see Magnus, supra note 151, at 150; Kröll, supra note 40, 
at 532–33; NEUMAYER ET AL., supra note 272, at 77–79; Franco Ferrari, in KOMMENTAR ZUM 
EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) 187 (Peter Schlechtriem et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013). For the 
different (and not prevailing) opinion see Warren Khoo, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW 34, 39 (C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim eds., 1987); HEUZÉ, supra note 80, at 261; 
HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 83, at 86. For an overview of the current dispute in case law and 
doctrine see Harry M. Flechtner, Conformity of Goods: Inspection and Notice, in INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 215, 220–22 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014). 
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issue of substance, not of procedure.290 Secondly, in the provision on a 
possible exemption, CISG Article 79(1) regulates expressis verbis (“if he 
proves that”) the burden of proof. Thirdly, the view that the CISG provides 
an indirect substantive regulation of the burden of proof follows from 
various presumptions and the principle-exception rule in a number of the 
Convention’s provisions, as indicated by the use of the wording “unless” 
(CISG Articles 2(a), 3(1), 14(2), 28, 33, 41, 47, 63), “except where” (CISG 
Article 35(2)(b)), “is assumed to include” (CISG Article 48(3)), or the 
structure of other provisions.291 Therefore, there are no reasons for an e 
contrario interpretation from CISG Article 79. The principle-exception rule 
is particularly clear under the caveat emptor rule in CISG Articles 35(3), 
42(2) and the good faith provision in CISG Article 40.292 
Under the caveat venditor principle underlying the default conformity 
rule in CISG Article 35, the seller is, in principle, liable for a lack of 
conformity. To escape this liability, the seller must prove that the buyer had 
de facto or constructive knowledge of the defect under the caveat emptor 
rule.293 Similarly, under CISG Articles 38 and 39, the buyer, in principle, 
has a duty to give the seller timely notice of lack of conformity; hence, the 
buyer must prove that the seller had the required knowledge under CISG 
Article 40 or a “reasonable excuse” for not giving timely notice of lack of 
conformity under CISG Article 44.294 In case of the buyer-friendly caveat 
                                                                                                                           
 
290 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations Opened for Signature in 
Rome, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 5 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
OJ:L:1980:266:FULL&from=EN [hereinafter Rome Convention]; Regulation No. 593/2008, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 15 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008R0593&from=EN [hereinafter Rome I]. See also NEUMAYER ET AL., supra 
note 272, at 77 (“Selon un principle généralement admis, dans sa détermination de la répartition du 
fardeau de la preuve, le juge ne doit pas perdre de vue la tenuer de la loi matérielle applicable, le lex 
causa, qui est ici par hypothèse la Convention [CISG].”). 
291 See NEUMAYER ET AL., supra note 272, at 77–79 (concurring in this view). 
292 See, inter alia, the implicit regulation of the burden of proof that can be deduced from CISG 
Article 35(2)(b) where the buyer must prove that a particular purpose is “expressly or impliedly made 
known to the seller,” but on the other hand the seller thereafter needs to prove the exception that 
“circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the 
seller’s skill and judgement.” CISG, supra note 1, at art. 35. See also Magnus, supra note 151, at 151. 
293 See Castel Elecs. Pty. Ltd. v. Toshiba Singapore Pte. Ltd., supra note 85. 
294 See Cour d’appel de Paris [CA] [Court of Appeal of Paris] Feb. 25, 2005, No. 03/21335 (Fr.), 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1095&step=FullText [hereinafter 
Computer motherboard case] (stating that there is no presumption regarding the knowledge of the seller 
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emptor rule, the seller’s proof that the buyer had constructive knowledge 
with the required high degree of negligence will facilitate and alleviate the 
demonstration of such proof under the domestic procedural law on evidence 
of the lex fori.295 
According to the position advocated here, this is as far as the CISG 
goes in terms of substantive regulation of the burden of proof. The CISG 
governs only substance and occasionally, either directly or indirectly, the 
placement of the burden of proof. It does not touch upon or govern 
procedure, including the law of evidence, the standard of proof, the 
proximity of proof, or a reversal of a burden of proof for one reason or the 
other. Therefore, an evidentiary principle of proximity of proof and a rule 
for a reversal of the burden of proof as an underlying principle of the CISG 
seems to be critical and oversteps the scope of the Convention.296 The 
limitation of the scope of application of the CISG, followed by the non-
prevailing view, should therefore be followed.297 
                                                                                                                           
 
of a lack of conformity under CISG Article 40 and that the buyer bears the burden of proof: “tandis que 
la Convention de Vienne ne fait peser sur le vendeur professionnel aucune présomption de connaissance 
de défaut de conformité en sorte qu’il incombe à l’acquéreur d’établir que ce vendeur avait la 
connaissance tant de l’usage et de la destination du produit acquis que de la non conformité alléguée 
. . . .”). See also Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Engineering Technical Supply Ltd., supra note 
14; Austrian paprika case, supra note 217. 
295 AUDIT, supra note 157, at 99 (“Il appartient toutefois au vendeur de faire la preuve de cette 
connaissance. La convention la lui facilite en assimilant à ce cas celui où l’acheteur ne pouvait 
ignorer.”). 
296 For German case law on Article 40 see German paprika case, supra note 214, at 7 (“Für Fälle 
der vorliegenden Art bedeutet dies zunächst, daß grundsätzlich der Käufer die tatsächlichen 
Voraussetzungen des Art. 40 CISG darzutun und gegebenenfalls zu beweisen hat, da er sich auf die 
Ausnahme von der (Regel-) Bestimmung des Art. 39 CISG über den Verlust des Rügerechts beruft. Das 
Berufungsgericht hat jedoch nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt, daß eine Ausnahme im Einzelfall unter 
dem Gesichtspunkt der Beweisnähe oder dann zuzulassen ist, wenn eine Beweisführung mit 
unzumutbaren Beweisschwierigkeiten für den Käufer verbunden wäre.”). The German paprika case was 
considered and confirmed by the Austrian Supreme Court. Austrian paprika case, supra note 217, at 16–
17 (“Ist der klagenden Partei [the buyer] obliegende Beweis der Bestrahlung der Ware vor Anlieferung 
als gelungen anzusehen, erscheint es daher nicht ausgeschlossen, dass der grundsätzlich 
beweispflichtigen klagenden Partei unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Unzumutbarkeit einer eigenen 
Beweisführung und der Beweisnähe der beklagten Partei eine Umkehrung der Beweislast 
zugutekommen soll. In diesem Fall träfe die beklagte Partei [the seller] die Beweislast für ihre 
Gutgläubigkeit.”) (emphasis added). 
297 The non-prevailing view is argued strongly by HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 83, at 86. 
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IX. THE KNOWLEDGE TEST AND A DE MINIMIS BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT 
When applying the knowledge test under the CISG a de minimis 
requirement of bona fide acting and dealing by the contracting parties is a 
prerequisite in order to reach this desirable equilibrium of the rights and 
obligations of the parties to a sales contract. So far, it may be assumed that 
legal comparatists and the doctrine on the CISG—despite the differing 
views of the good faith principle within the CISG—are in agreement about 
some sort of de minimis requirements for bona fide conduct by the parties. 
The CISG regime does not support fraudulent behaviour or acting in bad 
faith. For example, bad faith would be the case if a contracting party could 
rely on the other party’s failure to perform when it was that contracting 
party’s act or omission that had caused the other party’s failure to 
perform,298 or when that contracting party prevented the other party’s 
contract performance.299 Additionally, there would be bad faith if a 
contracting party were allowed to rely on a contract term—e.g., a non-oral 
modification or merger clause—that was contrary to the subsequent 
conduct of that same party and the reasonable expectations of the other 
party caused by that conduct.300 Finally, there would be bad faith if a buyer 
could claim lack of conformity or a seller could rely on the lack of or a too-
late notice of lack of conformity in situations where the buyer or seller had 
de facto or constructive knowledge of the non-conformity and failed to 
disclose this knowledge.301 The source of this de minimis bona fide 
requirement in international commerce is not exclusively in CISG Article 
7(1), as is argued by part of the doctrine and reiterated by some (mostly) 
continental European decisions in case law on the CISG.302 On the contrary, 
                                                                                                                           
 
298 See CISG Article 80 which should be regarded as a provision grounded on a good faith 
principle. CISG, supra note 1, at art. 80. 
299 See CISG, supra note 1, at art. 60 (“[I]n doing all acts which could reasonably be expected of 
him in order to enable the seller to make delivery . . . .”). 
300 See the principle underlying Article 29(2)—the venie contra factum proprium principle. CISG, 
supra note 1, at art. 29. 
301 See Article 35(3), 42 and the provision in Article 40 underlying good faith. CISG, supra note 
1, at arts. 35, 40, 42. 
302 The wording in CISG Article 7(1) is—similar to VCLT Article 31(1)—concerned with treaty 
interpretation and, thus, is in principle directed to the State’s party to the Convention. CISG, supra note 
1, at art. 7 (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to . . . the observance of good 
faith in international trade.”). 
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the legal source of this bona fide principle is an underlying principle of 
CISG Article 7(2), which can be deduced and developed from various 
provisions within the Convention itself. 
To illustrate the operation of the knowledge test and the delicate 
balance between the caveat venditor principle and the caveat emptor rule, 
we can return to the Clay cases discussed in Part IV.B.2 d) decided by the 
OLG Koblenz303 and the appeal by the BGH in 2012.304 One interesting part 
of the decision concerned the caveat emptor rule. The OLG Koblenz held 
that at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the buyer was not, under 
CISG Article 35(3), aware or gross negligently unaware of the dioxin 
contamination of the clay.305 Both courts found that the seller de facto was 
aware of the contamination and was therefore precluded from relying on the 
lack of notice according to CISG Article 40.306 Another interesting finding 
in the German court’s decision was the importance the court attached to the 
in casu well-known problems of dioxin contamination of clay delivered 
from Germany, which had been discussed in the public media, including 
specific mention of the clay delivered from the area in which the German 
seller had its production.307 
The relevant facts of the Clay case concerning the dioxin 
contamination of the delivered clay were as follows. Firstly, the parties had 
a long business relationship since the 1990s in trading with clay originating 
from the German seller but sold through Dutch supply company.308 In 2002, 
the Dutch supply company was taken over by the German seller. In 
previous sales transactions, dioxin contamination had never before been any 
issue.309 
Secondly, the Dutch buyer used the clay in a process that separated out 
large potatoes meant for French fries and salad for human consumption 
while the small potatoes together with the potato peels were used in animal 
feed.310 The seller knew about the buyer’s separation process and thus de 
                                                                                                                           
 
303 Clay case OLG, supra note 114. 
304 Clay case BGH, supra note 115. 
305 Clay case OLG, supra note 114, at 11. 
306 Id. at 13; Clay case BGH, supra note 115, at 10–11. 
307 Clay case OLG, supra note 114, at 13. 
308 Id. at 3. 
309 Id. 
310 Id.  
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facto knew about the expected use of the clay—which the BGH deemed to 
be an ordinary use according to CISG Article 35(2)(a).311 
Thirdly, in 1999 the high levels of natural dioxin had been found in 
clay extracted from pits in the area of Westerwald, Germany, including 
from the pit used by the German seller.312 In July 1999, a German statutory 
public law act prohibited the German seller from distributing the clay as an 
admixture in feedstuff.313 The German seller did not inform the buyer 
thereof.314 
Fourthly, the seller had disregarded dioxin contamination and 
continued from 2002 onwards to deliver to the Dutch buyer clay extracted 
from that concrete clay without providing any information or warnings 
concerning the de facto or at least very high likelihood of dioxin 
contamination.315 
Fifthly, the facts of the case revealed that there had been media reports 
about the dioxin contamination in both the Netherlands and Germany and, 
moreover, that the EU legislature in 1999 had intervened with various 
measures for reducing the dioxin levels in food and feedstuff, and that this 
had led to a general awareness thereof, including for the buyer.316 Both the 
OLG Koblenz and the BGH, however, held that the Dutch buyer was not 
specifically aware of the dioxin contamination in the concrete deliveries 
originating from the German seller’s pits.317 
Sixthly, despite the general knowledge of the dioxin problem, the 
buyer used the contaminated clay delivered by the German seller in the 
separation potato process without testing or taking cleaning precautions 
                                                                                                                           
 
311 Clay case BGH, supra note 115, at 10–11.  
312 Clay case OLG, supra note 114, at 3. 
313 Id. (“Verfügung der Bezirksregierung Koblenz vom 13.07.1999 wurde daraufhin der Firma . . . 
[Seller] untersagt, ihre Mahltone in den Verkehr zu bringen, soweit sie dazu bestimmt sind, bei der 
Herstellung von Futtermitteln als Zusatzstoff verwendet zu werden.”) (internal quotations ommitted). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 13. 
317 Id. at 13 (“Zwar hätte die Klägerin, wie noch auszuführen sein wird, wissen müssen, dass aus 
Deutschland stammende Tonerden Dioxin enthalten konnten. Dass aber gerade der an sie verkaufte Ton 
aus der Grube der Firma . . . [the seller] ganz erheblich dioxinbelastet war, musste der Klägerin nicht 
bekannt sein. Denn unstreitig wurde auch im Westerwald Ton gefördert, der nicht oder nicht in 
nennenswertem Umfang dioxinhaltig war.”) 
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and, furthermore, resold the potato products in the Dutch food and feed 
markets.318 
Finally, in the fall of 2004, following deliveries of clay to the Dutch 
buyer in July, increased dioxin levels were found in milk and milk products 
in the Netherlands and, subsequently, in November 2004, the Dutch 
authorities tested the deliveries of the German seller’s clay at the buyer’s 
place of business and found that the dioxin levels were too high.319 
From these facts, the general question of knowledge of the parties and 
of a fair equilibrium in this sales contract for the delivery of clay for the 
expected ordinary use in a potato-separation process arises and sets the 
legal CISG scene. Taking all relevant circumstances into account, how do 
we arrive at a fair assessment of the parties’ contractual rights and 
obligations? What did the caveat venditor principle demand of the German 
seller, and how should the caveat emptor rule, i.e., the general knowledge 
of the Dutch buyer, and the buyer’s sale of the potato products in the 
market without taking safety precautions be evaluated? 
At first sight, it seems as if both parties chose the easy solution and 
simply closed their eyes to the evident fact or suspicion of dioxin 
contamination hoping that the elevated dioxin levels would not be noticed. 
Their wish was not fulfilled, and a discussion of the de minimis requirement 
of a bona fide acting and dealing of the contracting parties therefore seems 
relevant. This in fact was the main issue addressed by the OLG Koblenz 
and the BGH, but from a different point of departure. 
While the OLG Koblenz utilized the broad good faith principle 
developed in the German language doctrine on the CISG and extended the 
caveat venditor principle to embrace an obligation of the German seller to 
inform, thereby, leaving the conformity issue open,320 the BGH resolved the 
case exclusively using the non-conformity provision in CISG Article 
35(2)(a).321 In its reasoning under the ordinary use requirement in CISG 
Article 35(2)(a), the BGH demanded that the goods be suitable for use 
according to their material and technical character and to the expectation of 
commerce. If the goods to some degree fall short of such an ordinary 
                                                                                                                           
 
318 Id. at 11. 
319 Id. at 7. 
320 This is quite clearly illustrated by the reference to the CISG doctrine. Id. at 12. 
321 Clay case BGH, supra note 115, at 10–11. 
108 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 34:23 
 
Vol. 34, No. 1 (2015) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2015.98 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
expected use, the seller must make a clear caveat regarding the limitation. 
Thus, in its decision in the appeal case, the BGH deduced an obligation to 
inform from the default rule on conformity in CISG Article 35(2)(a) and, 
hence, the underlying caveat venditor principle, when a (high) quality 
demand is not met or when there is uncertainty about what the proper use 
is.322 It is quite an extensive obligation to provide information and take 
precautions, which according to the BGH follows directly from CISG 
Article 35(1) and (2)—the caveat venditor principle: 
Vielmehr hätte gerade die fehlende Kenntnis, ob ein sicherer Einsatz des 
gelieferten Separierungstons bei der Klägerin gewährleistet war, die Beklagte 
zur Vorsicht veranlassen müssen. Deshalb wäre ein entsprechender 
Gefahrenhinweis geboten gewesen, um von vornherein jegliche 
Gefahrverwirklichung durch den dioxinverunreinigten Separierungston bei der 
anschließenden Futtermittelproduktion auszuschließen.323 
The OLG Koblenz deduced an identical obligation to provide information 
from an extensive general bona fide principle.324 Although a broad good 
faith principle—similar to the general German domestic principle “Treu 
und Glauben” in BGB section 242—is not supported in the CISG doctrine 
and case law, that the CISG has a de minimis requirement that the 
contracting parties act and deal bona fide with each other seems to be 
unquestionable. That said, the exact scope and content of such a limited 
                                                                                                                           
 
322 Id. (“Zwar muss sich eine Ware, um diesen Verkehrserwartungen zu genügen, nicht für alle 
theoretisch denkbaren Verwendungsformen und Verwendungsmöglichkeiten eignen, sondern nur für 
diejenigen, die nach ihrer stofflichen und technischen Auslegung und der hieran anknüpfenden 
Verkehrserwartung nahe liegen. Wird allerdings eine an sich nahe liegende Verwendung von den 
tatsächlich vorhandenen Verwendungs- und Einsatzmöglichkeiten nicht mehr abgedeckt, fehlt ihr die 
von Art. 35 Abs. 2 Buchst. a CISG geforderte Eignung zum gewöhnlichen Gebrauch, sofern der 
Verkäufer die bestehende Einschränkung nicht deutlich macht . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
323 Id. at 13. 
324 Clay case OLG, supra note 114, at 12 (“Der Begriff ‘good faith’ wird ausdrücklich zwar nur 
verwendet in Art. 7 Abs. 1 CISG, zu folgen ist aber der herrschenden Meinung, dass in der Gesamtheit 
der Bestimmungen des UN-Kaufrechts das Gebot der Beachtung von ‘good faith’ als allgemeiner 
Grundsatz zum Ausdruck kommt . . . . Art. 7 Abs. 1 CISG schreibt vor, dass bei der Auslegung des 
Übereinkommens neben dessen internationalem Charakter und der Notwendigkeit einer einheitliche 
Anwendung auch ‘die Wahrung des guten Glaubens’ (‘the observance of good faith,’ ‘d’assurer le 
respect de la bonne foi’) im internationalen Handel zu beachten sind. Die Verwendung des Begriffes 
“guter Glaube” in der—nicht verbindlichen—deutschen Übersetzung ist allerdings insofern verfehlt, als 
die Bedeutung von ‘good faith’ (‘la bonne foi’) sich deutlich von dem deutschen Rechtsbegriff des 
guten Glaubens unterscheidet (. . .) und dem Prinzip von Treu und Glauben i. S. von § 242 BGB sehr 
nahekommt . . . .”). 
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good faith principle is, and will remain, debatable and will need to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. The reasoning of the OLG Koblenz in 
Clay case from 2011 does, however, set convincing conditions for 
determining the framework in which a de minimis good faith principle can 
be applied: “Die Verkäuferin verfügte also über einen für den 
Vertragszweck wesentlichen Wissensvorsprung gegenüber ihrer 
Vertragspartnerin. Indem sie ihr Wissen der Klägerin vorenthielt und diese 
so ‘ins offene Messer laufen ließ,’ verstieß sie gegen ein—auch im 
internationalen Handel anerkanntes—Prinzip des Verhaltens eines ehrbaren 
Kaufmanns.”325 
In situations in which either the seller or the buyer has a “fundamental 
knowledge advantage” which can easily be passed on to the other 
contracting party, and when such information is crucial for the fulfilment of 
the purpose of the contract, it should be disclosed to the other party and 
necessary precautions should be made. This is underlined by the caveat 
venditor and the caveat emptor principles. A commercial gentleman will 
not let the other contracting party run into a trap. This would be against a 
principle of the behaviour of an honourable businessman (“Prinzip des 
Verhaltens eines ehrbaren Kaufmanns”). 
X. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The discourse has illuminated the difficult but immense importance of 
determining the knowledge of contracting parties, which is not only a 
procedural problem of evidence. In practice the question has immense 
importance as the knowledge the parties have will decisively shape the 
rights and obligations of the parties. The question concerns the required 
diligence of a businessman in order for him to be aware and not negligently 
unaware of relevant facts and information. If a businessman does not act 
with the required diligence—which can be ordinary diligence or more or 
less diligence—in his conduct and behaviour, he may be put on a 
constructive (fictive) knowledge different from de facto (actual) 
knowledge. This required diligence will depend on the knowledge test 
                                                                                                                           
 
325 Id. at 13–14. 
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applied. It is vital for a harmonized global sales law regime that the content 
of the knowledge test is as clearly described and defined as possible. 
Throughout history and since Roman times, the topic of the 
constructive (fictive) knowledge and of the different degrees of negligence 
has occupied doctrine and case law in various jurisdictions. Setting a global 
commercial framework for the knowledge test under the CISG is not an 
easy endeavour. However, I have said this much because we are faced with 
a large body of inconsistent CISG case law using a wide spectrum of 
vocabulary and formulations and, moreover, challenged with various 
opinions in the CISG doctrine, and also because I think it is an issue of 
great importance for international commercial law. I hope—like the English 
Justice Holt years ago as he elaborated on the degrees of negligence—that 
the analysis has cleared the main issues and made a more prospered outlook 
for the future of the knowledge test under the CISG: 
I have said thus much in this case, because it is of great consequence, that the 
law should be settled in this point, but I don’t know whether I may have settled 
it, or may not rather have unsettled it. But however that happen, I have stirred 
these points, which wiser heads in time may settle.326 
The article demonstrates that the undefined knowledge test under the CISG 
consists of the threefold distinction based on de facto knowledge, gross 
negligence (culpa lata) and simple or ordinary negligence (culpa levis—the 
latter being a reasonable businessman test, i.e., the bonus pater familias 
test). This threefold distinction is supported by the wording of the CISG, 
legislative history, convincing arguments and, moreover, a strong view in 
doctrine and case law. 
In addition, the analysis provides for guidance on a definition of the 
knowledge test under the CISG and addresses in particular the 
interpretation of the formulation “could not have been unaware,” which is 
the disputed part of the knowledge test under the CISG. This wording of the 
CISG knowledge test is interpreted differently and finds all sorts of more or 
less clear expressions in case law. The article concludes that the 
formulation “could not have been unaware” expresses a gross negligence 
(culpa lata) standard. 
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It is strongly recommended that the wording “could not have been 
unaware” under the CISG is used by the parties in their contract drafting 
and by courts and tribunals in their decisions together with an express 
reference to a gross negligent standard in order to achieve uniformity in 
expressions and results. This should be done for the purpose of promoting 
certainty in determining the subjective intention of parties and ensuring the 
meeting of the minds (animus contrahendi) under CISG Article 8 and for 
the purpose of maintaining the balance that the CISG strikes between the 
rights and obligations of the seller and of the buyer. The identical terms on 
the knowledge test “could not have been unaware” in, inter alia, CISG 
Article 8(1), 35(3) and Article 40 must be interpreted in the same way in 
order to maintain the equilibrium of the sales contract established by the 
Convention and its drafters and achieve uniformity in the application of the 
CISG. The threefold distinction of simple or ordinary negligence (culpa 
levis), gross negligence (culpa lata) and de facto knowledge expresses 
underlying principles for the knowledge test of the global CISG. 
When applying the knowledge test under the CISG a de minimis 
requirement of bona fide acting and dealing by the contracting parties is a 
prerequisite in order to reach the desirable equilibrium of the rights and 
obligations of the parties to a sales contract and to encourage and oblige 
contracting parties to exchange knowledge and information to the benefit of 
global commerce. The knowledge test under the CISG should be applied in 
conjunction with a minimum good faith requirement regarding the parties’ 
conduct and statements. 
